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MICHIGAN WORKER'S* DISABILITY
COMPENSATION ACT: THE INTENTIONAL
TORT EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIVE
REMEDY PROVISION
I. INTRODUCTION
Workers' compensation is a no-fault insurance system designed by
state governments to provide medical treatment and to partially replace in-
come to workers who suffer work-related injuries." In return for funding the
program, employers are insulated from common law negligence liability by
inclusion of a statutory exclusive remedy provision.' Courts have long rec-
ognized an intentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy provision,
however, by holding that the exclusive remedy provision does not immunize
employers from liability for intentional torts which they commit against
their employees.3
Recently, employees have become dissatisfied with the minimal bene-
fits provided through workers' compensation, particularly as compared to
the generous compensatory and punitive damage verdicts that have been
awarded through common law negligence actions." These dissatisfied em-
* Authors disagree on the punctuation of "worker's." The Michigan Statute places
the apostrophe before the "s," as the title indicates. In this note, each title and quote will be
punctuated in accordance with the source. Since workers' compensation provides benefits for
many injured workers, this note will use the plural possessive form and place the apostrophe
after the "s" in all textual references.
1. See generally Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co., 427 Mich. 1, 6-9, 398 N.W.2d 882,
884-85 (1986); B. SMALL, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw OF INDIANA, § 1.1, at 1-2 (1950).
See also infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
2. See generally Beauchamp, 427 Mich. at 8, 398 N.W.2d at 885; B. SMALL, supra
note 1, § 2.4, at 23. See also infra note 74 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 108 Tex. 96, 185 S.W. 556,
(1916) (which held that the Texas workers' compensation law did not preclude suits for an
employer's intentional tort); Richardson v. The Fair, Inc., 124 S.W.2d 885, 886 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939) (employer may not use workers' compensation exclusive remedy provision as a
shield from liability for hiring another person to assault employee). See also infra notes 80 &
88-91 and accompanying text.
4. Appleby, The Practical Labor Lawyer, 12 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 528, 529 (1986-
87); Ghiardi, Intentional Acts-An Exception to the Exclusivity of Workers' Compensation, 37
FED'N INS. & CORP. CouNs. Q. 149, 151 (1987); Comment, The Exclusive Remedy Provision
of Michigan Workers' Disability Compensation Act, 63 U. DET. L. REV. 453, 455-56 (1986).
See also Lambert, Workers' Compensation Exclusivity, 28 ATLA REP. 293, 294 (1985)
[hereinafter ATLA] (quantifying the difference between a tort recovery and workers' compen-
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ployees have attempted to avoid the workers' compensation exclusive rem-
edy provision by petitioning courts to redefine an intentional tort in a broad
fashion, thereby expanding the intentional tort exception.6 Generally, the
employee files an intentional tort suit and requests that the court replace
the more restrictive "true intentional tort" test6 with the more liberal "sub-
stantial certainty" test7 as the standard for determining what constitutes an
sation benefits).
5. See, e.g., Beauchamp, 427 Mich. at 4, 398 N.W.2d at 883 (plaintiff alleged that
employer had intentionally misrepresented and fraudulently concealed the danger of exposure
to toxic chemicals); Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 90, 472 N.E.2d 1046 (1984) (plain-
tiff alleged that employer had removed safety equipment); Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., 246
S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978) (safety equipment removal).
6. 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 68.15, at 13-61, §
68.13, at 13-36 to -44 (1987) (true intentional tort test requires the plaintiff-employee to prove
that the employer intended the injury as well as the act); Beauchamp, 427 Mich. at 19, 398
N.W.2d at 891 ("[T]he employer truly intended the injury as well as the act."); Ghiardi,
supra note 4, at 155. "This standard is very stringent and difficult to prove in any situation
which falls short of direct assault and battery by an employer." Id. The first reason that the
true intentional tort test has been very narrowly construed is that courts have frequently de-
fined intent as the desire to produce a result. See Amchan, Callous Disregard for Employee
Safety: The Exclusivity of the Workers' Compensation Remedy Against Employers, 34 LAB.
L.J. 683, 688 (1983). See, e.g., Johnson v. Mountaire Farms, 305 Md., 246, 258, 503 A.2d
708, 712 (1986). But see 2A A. LARSON, supra, § 68.15, at 13-64, -65. It is quite possible to
intend a thing without desiring it. Id. If one knows that a particular result will ensue and
nevertheless goes ahead, then he may rightfully be said to intend that result, whether he de-
sired it or not. Id. The second reason that the test was narrowly construed was that courts once
required that the injurious act must be directed toward a particular person. Courts have gener-
ally liberalized the standard to discard that requirement. But see Orzechowski v. Warner-
Lambert Co., 92 A.D.2d 110, 113, 460 N.Y.S.2d 64, 66 (1983) (requiring that employer in-
tended to harm a particular employee as recently as 1983).
7. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 68.15, at 13-61 (substantial certainty test requires
the plaintiff to prove that the employer "intended the act, but it is enough that he knew that
injury was substantially certain to occur from the act"); Beauchamp, 427 Mich. at 21-22, 398
N.W.2d at 891-92. This test is derived from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS' definition
of intent which reads: "The word 'intent' . . . denote[s] that the actor desires to cause the
consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to
result from it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). Courts that adopt the sub-
stantial certainty test generally do not view it as a different standard than the true intentional
tort test. They simply reject the true intentional tort test, a definition they consider to be
excessively strict, and define an intentional tort for workers' compensation purposes in the
same way that they define it for general tort purposes. See, e.g., Millison v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161, 501 A.2d 505 (1985); Ver Bouwens v. Hamm Wood Prods.,
334 N.W.2d 874, 876 (S.D. 1983); Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 689 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. 1985).
See also 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. § 4121.80 (Baldwin) (set out infra note 162) (defining sub-
stantial certainty as deliberate intent). But see Case Note, Workers' Compensa-
tion-Intentional Injury Exception to the Exclusive Remedy Provision-An Employer's In-
tentional Failure to Maintain a Safe Workplace Is Not an Intentional Act Unless the
Employer Is Substantially Certain That Such Conduct Would Cause the Injury, 17 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 513, 519 (1986) (where the author declares that the choice of tests is immaterial
because the standard of proof is substantially similar under either). Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court of Michigan chose to look at the standard as two separate tests. Beauchamp, 427 Mich.
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intentional tort exception to the workers' compensation exclusive remedy
provision.
On December 23, 1986, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that
there was an intentional tort exception to the workers' compensation exclu-
sive remedy rule in Michigan." The court rejected the "true intentional
tort" test and adopted the "substantial certainty" test for determining when
an employer would be adjudged to have committed an intentional tort.9 The
true intentional tort test requires the plaintiff to prove that the employer
intended both the act which caused the injury and the injury itself.10 The
substantial certainty test is satisfied by proof that the employer intended
the act and was substantially certain that the injury would occur.'1 Because
the true intentional tort test requires evidence that the employer actually
intended the injury, this test is more difficult to satisfy."2
Five months after the Supreme Court of Michigan adopted the sub-
stantial certainty test, the Michigan Legislature amended the Worker's
Disability Compensation Act to codify the intentional tort exception.' 3 The
language used in this recent codification, however, is ambiguous . 4 The stat-
at 19-25, 398 N.W.2d at 891-93.
8. Beauchamp, 427 Mich. at 11, 398 N.W.2d at 886. See also infra note 82 and
accompanying text (where the holding is explained).
9. Id. at 25, 398 N.W.2d at 893.
10. See supra note 6.
II. See supra note 7.
12. Ghiardi, supra note 4, at 155-56.
13. 1987 Mich. Pub. Acts 28 (codified at MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 418.131 (West
Supp. 1988)) (set out infra note 128). Beauchamp was decided on Dec. 23, 1986; the act was
passed on May 14, 1987.
14. Litigants will argue opposing interpretations just as Senators Dillingham and
Cherry did when they presented Senate Bill 67 to the Senate and recommended its adoption.
See MICHIGAN SENATE, 1987 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, at 1233-35 (May 14, 1987).
Mr. President, with your permission, because we've had so much deliberation in the past
over workers' compensation, I do have a statement that I would like to read before the
house involving the exclusive remedy provision. I think it's very important to have this
statement made because we want to make sure that we have properly clarified things as
Senator DeGrow and I, as Senate Republican conferees, see this .... The primary con-
cern of the Senate has been the impact of the Beauchamp vs. Dow Chemical Supreme
Court decision on the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' [sic] Disability Com-
pensation Act. It has been the goal of the Senate to restore the integrity of the exclusive
remedy provision and avoid a new window of litigation that would threaten the financial
stability of Michigan business and government.
The section 131 statutory language agreed to in conference is designed to restore the
complete and absolute status of the exclusive remedy provision in Michigan's workers'
compensation law. Under the proposed new langauge, the one and only exception to the
exclusive remedy provision is an action for an intentional tort where the employer in-
tended the injury to the employee. We have been assured by the conferees and by repre-
sentatives of Governor Blanchard, and it is our intent in proposing this language, that the
injured employee may only bring an intentional tort action in a court of law if the em-
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ute first defines an intentional tort as "specific intent," 15 which is associated
with the true intentional tort test."8 The statute then defines "intent to in-
jure" as actual knowledge that injury is certain to occur and willful disre-
gard of that knowledge.17 The inclusion of the terms "certain" and "will-
fully disregard" is ambiguous because those terms suggest a broader, more
liberal standard than the true intentional tort test.18
The statutory ambiguity requires judicial interpretation to implement
the legislative intent.19 Defendant-employers will argue that the legislature
ployer knowingly and deliberately injured the employee. An act which is only somewhat
certain or likely to cause injury or which has a less than 100 percent certainty of causing
an injury to a specific employee does not constitute intent to injure under this language.
The employer must know with certainty that a specific employee will be injured in order
to constitute an intentional tort.
There has been some concern that an intentional tort exception with too many quali-
fications might permit a lawsuit if the employer only had knowledge of a workplace con-
dition that could cause injury. It is our intent, in section 131, to establish language which
is unqualified and straight forward under which knowledge of a condition does not consti-
tute an exception to the exclusive remedy provision. Only when an employer with specific
intent knowingly and deliberately injures a specific employee is there any exception to the
general rule.
Id. at 1233-34 (statement of Senator Dillingham).
[A]pparently the decision has been made tonight that we're to talk to the court ...
[W]e have rushed headlong to restrict the recent Supreme Court's Beauchamp deci-
sion. . . .It is clear that intentional torts are actionable and not prohibited by the exclu-
sive remedy provision. The change in the standard although narrowing the substantial
certainty test does not preclude the specific cases which the Supreme court indicated were
actionable under the Beauchamp decision. In Cerna [sic] vs. Statewide Contracts [sic]
the facts outlined by the court fall squarely within the new exemption. In Cerna [sic]
there was a deliberate act certainty that an injury would occur and willful disregarding of
the knowledge. A similar result would attend in the film recovery [sic] case cited as an
example by the court. In that case, the facts showed a deliberate act, certainty of an
injury and a willful disregard of a knowledge of an injury.
Id. at 1234-35 (statement of Senator Cherry).
15. See MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 418.131 (West Supp. 1988) (set out infra note
128 and accompanying text).
16. See Ghiardi, supra note 4, at 155 (deliberate and specific intent required). See,
e.g., Johnson v. Mountaire Farms, 305 Md. 246, 503 A.2d 708 (1986) (in which the court, in
declining to expand the exception, stated that the statutory exception requires "actual, specific,
and deliberate" intent). Id. at 255, 258, 503 A.2d at 712, 714.
17. See MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 418.131 (West Supp. 1988) (set out infra note
128).
18. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
19. When a statute is ambiguous, interested parties file suit and each advances the
most favorable interpretation. The court must declare which interpretation the legislature
meant to enact. See, e.g., Franks v. White Pine Copper Div., 422 Mich. 636, 375 N.W.2d 715
(1985). The court stated that no interpretation is required if the statutory language is clear
because legislative intent controls. Id. at 670, 375 N.W.2d at 730. If, however, there is ambi-
guity or reasonable minds might disagree as to the meaning of the statutory language, the
courts must interpret that language for the parties. Id. at 670-71, 375 N.W.2d at 730. See
also Evans v. Yankeetown Dock Corp., 491 N.E.2d 969, 971-73 (Ind. 1986) (if a statute is
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 3 [1989], Art. 4
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rejected the substantial certainty test and will base their arguments on the
"specific intent" portion of the definition which reflects the true intentional
tort test.20 Plaintiff-employees, on the other hand, will focus on the second
sentence, where the terms "certain" and "willful disregard" are used. Here
the plaintiff-employees will argue that in defining specific intent, the legisla-
ture chose the word "certain," which suggests substantial certainty, rather
than "intend," which would have indicated specific intent. The legislature
chose the word "certain," the plaintiff-employees will allege, because the
legislature did not mean to adopt the true intentional tort test. These em-
ployees will claim that the legislature adopted the substantial certainty
test21 and codified the court's definition merely to avoid further enlargement
of the exception.22
Due to the enigmatic intentional tort definition in the Michigan
Worker's Disability Compensation Act amendment, neither the parties in-
voking the statute nor the Michigan courts can adequately decipher the
legislative intent.23 Employers and employees will exercise their right to test
ambiguous, the court must ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent). In White Pine,
the court was mistaken in its interpretation. The holding was expressly overruled by the 1987
amendment to the Michigan Worker's Disability Compensation Act. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. § 418.354(17) (West Supp. 1988).
20. Employers will argue that the legislature adopted the true intentional tort test be-
cause the plaintiff-employee's burden of proof is greater under that test. See supra notes 6 &
12 and accompanying text.
21. In addition to arguing that the word "certain" suggests that the legislature meant
to codify the substantial certainty test, plaintiff-employees will claim that "willful disregard"
suggests another lenient standard, willful and wanton misconduct, which supports their argu-
ment that the legislature did not intend to adopt the more restrictive true intentional tort test.
Finally, they will claim that "certain" is really no different than substantially certain. See,
e.g., Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280 (1935). In Del Vecchio, the Supreme Court, while
evaluating the "substantial evidence" required to support a Longshoreman's and Harbor
Worker's Compensation Act decision, held that "substantial" added nothing to the principle
that the decision must be supported by evidence. Id. at 286. Citing Del Vecchio, employees
will argue that "substantial" adds nothing to substantial evidence, meaning the two are the
same. Likewise, they will claim that "certain" is the equivalent of substantial certainty, the
test already established by the Supreme Court of Michigan.
22. See Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161, 501 A.2d 505
(1985). The court must enforce the legislative will, unless the law is unconstitutional. Id. at
181, 501 A.2d at 516. See also Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co., 427 Mich. 1, 24, 398 N.W.2d
882, 893 (1986) (cautioning that the standard is not to be expanded to substantial risk while
neglecting to define what a "substantial risk" standard would be).
23. When a statute is ambiguous and the legislative history is sparse, the courts may
not be able to correctly ascertain the legislative intent. See, e.g., Franks v. White Pine Copper
Div., 422 Mich. 636, 375 N.W.2d 715 (1985). An amendment to the Michigan Worker's
Disability Compensation Act stated that workers' compensation should be co-ordinated. That
is, workers' compensation should be reduced by any amount that injured employees received
from other sources, such as unemployment, retirement, and social security. Franks, 422 Mich.
at 651, 375 N.W.2d at 721. The employers contended that the amendment applied to benefits
paid after the act was effective for injuries which occurred before the act's effective date. Id. at
Parkhurst: Michigan Worker's Compensation Act:  The Intentional Tort Excepti
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their opposing interpretations in the courts." One of the purposes of work-
ers' compensation statutes is to provide a certain remedy in place of the
uncertainty, delay, and expense of litigation.2 5 Because of the ambiguous
definition, the Michigan intentional tort exception frustrates that purpose.
This note suggests that the statute should be amended to clarify the
standard used to define the intentional tort exception to workers' compensa-
tion. The first section will examine the benefits that workers' compensation
provides to employees and employers. Also included will be a discussion of
the development of the intentional tort exception in Michigan and other
states. The following section will explore the tension created by the ambigu-
ous language contained in the intentional tort exception of the Worker's
Disability Compensation Act when considered in conjunction with the Su-
preme Court of Michigan's adoption of the substantial certainty test. The
final section will propose an amendment to clarify the Michigan law which
adopts the true intentional tort test and provides an alternative method of
proof for certain recurring, but difficult-to-prove, situations.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTENTIONAL TORT EXCEPTION IN MICHIGAN
A. Workers' Compensation Laws and Social Policy Considerations
An understanding of the history of workers' compensation law reveals
the importance of the controversy over the definition of the intentional tort
exception. At the beginning of the twentieth century, many of the workers
who gravitated to factories following the industrial revolution suffered from
644-45, 375 N.W.2d at 718. The employees contended that the amendment applied only to
benefits for injuries incurred after the amendment's effective date. Id. at 648-49, 375 N.W.2d
at 720. The Supreme Court of Michigan held that the amendment applied to all benefits paid
after the effective date regardless of when the injury occurred. Id. at 651, 375 N.W.2d at 721.
Franks was erroneously decided however. The 1987 Michigan Worker's Disability Compensa-
tion Act amendment stated that Franks was erroneously decided as it applied to injuries in-
curred before the effective date of the amendment. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
418.354(17) (West Supp. 1988).
24. The requirement that one must have a basis in the law or a good faith argument for
extension infers that a party can litigate a good faith claim when the law is ambiguous. See
FED. R. Civ. PRO. 11.
25. Vieweg, Erosion of the Exclusive Remedy Doctrine Actions Against the Employer,
17 FORUM 422 (1981) (quoting from REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION OF STATE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, 34 (1972)).
Historically, the three purposes of worker's compensation were: prompt and predeter-
mined benefits at adequate levels; relief from the uncertainty of recovery and elimination
of costly and wasteful litigation; and limited employer and [sic] liability. The five objec-
tives of modern workers' compensation are: broad coverage of employee and [sic] work-
related injuries and diseases; substantial protection against interruption of income; provi-
sion of sufficient medical care and rehabilitation services; encouragement of safety; and
an effective system for delivery of benefits and services.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 3 [1989], Art. 4
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serious work-related injuries.26 The disabled worker could sue his employer
for negligence, 27 but under this common law theory the employee seldom
recovered a judgment sufficient to cover his medical expenses, let alone sup-
port himself and his family during his disability.2 Commentators have esti-
mated that disabled employees lost approximately eighty percent of their
negligence suits under the common law negligence system.2"
Several factors combined to make this common law negligence system
unfair to employees. First, plaintiff-employees usually lost their lawsuits
due to the formidable evidentiary burden imposed on them.30 Under the
common law system the employee had to prove that his employer assumed
a duty of reasonable care toward him 1 and also had to prove that the em-
ployer had breached that duty and thereby caused the plaintiff's injury.3 2
Second, employers could assert the defenses of contributory negligence,"
assumption of risk, 4 and the fellow-servant doctrine."5 Third, disabled em-
26. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 4.00, at 23, § 4.50, at 32, § 5.20, at 33. See generally
Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 HARV. L. REv. 328,
329-30 (1912); Comment, supra note 4, at 455.
27. Unless the employer voluntarily recompensed the employee, the only way for an
employee to receive any compensation was to pursue a common law negligence suit. See gener-
ally 1 A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 4.30, at 25-28.
28. See infra notes 29 & 39 and accompanying text. See also 1 A. LARSON, supra note
6, § 4.50, at 32; Epstein, The Historic Origins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compen-
sation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775 (1982). The employer owed the employee no duty; like the
sovereign, the employer was immune from suit. Id. at 777. The employee was expected to be
thankful that he had employment and he was expected to accept all risks. Id.
29. W. PROSSER, W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEE-
TON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 80, at 572 n.43 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSOR & KEE-
TON]. Various authorities have estimated that 70-94% of the industrial accidents were uncom-
pensated at common law. Id.
30. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 4.30, at 28. See also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
29, § 80, at 569; Comment, The New Workers' Compensation Law in Ohio: Senate Bill 307
Was No Accident, 20 AKRON L. REv. 491, 493 (1987).
31. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 4.30, at 28.
32. Id.
33. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 29, § 80, at 569. The defendant is not liable if the
plaintiff's own negligent conduct contributes to his harm. Id. § 65, at 451-52. Since the plain-
tiff's conduct does not meet the standard required for his own protection, the law denies him
recovery, although the defendant would otherwise be liable. Id.
34. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 29, § 80, at 569. Assumption of risk means that
the employee knows the risk is present and understands its nature, and nevertheless freely and
voluntarily chooses to incur that risk. Id. § 68, at 486. Employees were expected to accept
responsibility for all obvious risks associated with a job or seek other employment. Id. § 80, at
568. Little consideration was given to the fact that frequently a worker's only choices were
between equally hazardous jobs or destitution. Id.
35. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 29, § 80, at 569; Note, Exceptions to the Exclu-
sive Remedy Requirements of Workers' Compensation Statutes, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1641,
1644 (1983). The fellow-servant doctrine states that an employer is not vicariously liable for
injuries which one employee inflicts on another employee. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 29,
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ployees were without income while they pursued a legal remedy.36 Finally,
if the disabled employee won his negligence suit, most of his modest judg-
ment was consumed by medical bills and attorney's fees. 7 Consequently,
disabled employees often settled out of court for whatever their employers
offered as a settlement.8 8 Disabled workers thus bore the financial, as well
as the physical, burden of industrial accidents. 9
Social policy considerations compelled the development of a program
to aid injured workers.40 Accidents, it was thought, are an unavoidable inci-
dent of industry.4' Applying that logic, society decided that a person who
was injured at work was entitled to payment of his medical expenses and a
partial replacement of lost wages.42 The price of a product could include the
cost of a disabling human injury 3 just as the price of the product included
the cost of the human energy and raw materials consumed in production. 4
Legislatures thus developed workers' compensation programs in re-
sponse to the public demand to help disabled workers.4 European countries
led the attack, creating the first workers' compensation programs in the late
§ 80, at 571. Prosser refers to the three defenses as "the unholy trinity" because they defeated
so many employees' suits. Id. § 80, at 569.
36. PROSSER & KETON, supra note 29, § 80, at 572-73 & n.44 (litigation pressured
the injured to settle in order to have enough money to live while creating legal fees and other
expenses, which often consumed most of the money the plaintiff finally received) (citing to
REPORT OF MICHIGAN EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY COMMISSION, 16 (1911)).
37. Id. § 80, at 572.
38. Id. § 80, at 572-73.
39. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 80, at 530 (4th ed. 1971)
("[b]y far the greater proportion of industrial accidents remained uncompensated, and the
burden fell upon the workman, who was least able to support it").
40. See Bohlen, supra note 26, at 329, 333; Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co., 427 Mich.
1, 6, 398 N.W.2d 882, 884 (1986) (noting the "wide dissatisfaction" with the existing negli-
gence system).
41. Note, supra note 35, at 1642. See also Epstein, supra note 28, at 815 (asserting
that accidents are an "inevitable toll" of production). That theory is still an important part of
the workers' compensation philosophy. See MICHIGAN SENATE, SENATE FISCAL AGENCY BILL
ANALYSIS, at 5 (May 26, 1987) (stating that "[W]orkers' compensation systems . . . rest on
the belief that in an imperfect world, there are going to be workplace accidents .... "). Id.
Each Senate Fiscal Agency Bill Analysis contains a disclaimer stating that the Analysis is not
authority on legislative intent. This Note will cite the Bill Analyses, however, because they are
the best available indicators of legislative intent.
42. See Bohlen, supra note 26, at 328-31; Comment, supra note 26, at 456; 1 A. LAR-
SON, supra note 6, § 2.20, at 5-7. The benefits should be bestowed in a dignified manner, not
subjecting the employee to starvation, begging, or public or private charity.
43. Note, supra note 35, at 1642; Bohlen, supra note 26, at 330.
44. Bohlen, supra note 26, at 330.
45. Comment, supra note 4, at 455-56 (originally, employers were opposed to workers'
compensation, while workers deemed it a blessing). But see Amchan, supra note 6, at 685.
Employers may have seen a trend toward high damage judgments developing and welcomed
the workers' compensation system to block that trend. Id.
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nineteenth century." The American states soon followed.' 7 In 1912, Michi-
gan joined the parade of states enacting workers' compensation statutes.48
Workers' compensation was designed as a quid pro quo exchange' 9
46. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 5.10, at 33-35, § 57.14(b), at 10-50. Germany en-
acted a modern workers' compensation law in 1884; England in 1897. Id. Twenty countries or
provinces enacted workers' compensation laws before the United States. See also Bohlen,
supra note 26, at 329.
47. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 5.10, at 33, § 5.20, at 37. Several early statutes were
declared unconstitutional, but by 1920, all but eight states had enacted workers' compensation
laws and by 1949, all states had workers' compensation systems. Id. § 5.20, at 37-38, § 5.30,
at 39. See ALA. CODE §§ 25-5-1 to -203 (1986 & Supp. 1987); ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.30.005-
.45.010 (1984); ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-901 to -1091 (1983 & Supp. 1987); ARK. CODE
OF 1987 ANN. §§ 11-9-101 to -811 (1987 & Supp. 1987); CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3201-8004
(West 1971 & Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-40-101 to -112 (1986 & Supp. 1987);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-275 to -355a (West 1987 & Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
19, §§ 2301-2397 (1985 & Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 440.01-.60 (West 1981 & Supp.
1988); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-9-1 to -367 (1988); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 386-1 to -214 (1985 &
Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE §§ 72-101 to -1026 (1973 & Supp. 1988); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
para. 138.1-.30 (1987); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3-1-1 to -11-6 (West 1981 & Supp. 1988);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 85.1-.71 (West 1984 & Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-501 to -
591 (1986 & Supp. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 342.012-.990 (Baldwin 1986); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 23:1021-:1379 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, §§ 1-
195 (1978 & Supp. 1988); MD. ANI. CODE art. 101, §§ 1-98 (1985 & Supp. 1988); MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, §§ 1-86 (West 1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 418.101-.941
(West 1985 & Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 176.011-.85 (West 1966 & Supp. 1988);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 71-3-1 to -119 (1973 & Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 287.010-.800
(Vernon 1965 & Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-71-101 to -2914 (1987); NEB. REv.
STAT. §§ 48-101 to 109 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 616.010-.680 (Michie 1986 &
Supp. 1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 281:1-:55 (1987 & Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
34:15-1 to -128 (West 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-1-1 to -70 (1987); N.Y. WORK. COMP.
LAW §§ 1-430.12 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -142 (1985 &
Supp. 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-01-01 to -14-04 (1985 & Supp. 1987); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 4123.01-.99 (Baldwin 1983 & Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, §§ 1-
180 (West 1970 & Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 656.001-.807 (1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
77, 9H 1-1601.1 (Purdon 1952 & Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-29-1 to -38-25 (1986 &
Supp. 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-1-10 to -19-50 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1987); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 62-1-1 to -9-15 (1978); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-6-101 to -410
(1983 & Supp. 1988); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 8306-8309 (Vernon 1967 & Supp.
1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-1 to -107 (1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 601-710 (1987
& Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.1-1 to -163 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
51.04.010-98.080 (1962 & Supp. 1989); W. VA. CODE §§ 23-1-1 to -6-2 (1985 & Supp.
1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 102.01-.75 (West 1988); Wyo. STAT. §§ 27-14-101 to -804
(1987).
48. See Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co., 427 Mich. 1, 8, 398 N.W.2d 882, 885 (1986).
Originally, the Michigan law was optional for employers, but their common law defenses were
abolished whether they participated in workers' compensation or not. Id. The legislature
amended the statute to make it mandatory in 1943. Id. at 8, 398 N.W.2d at 885.
49. Vieweg, supra note 25, at 422-23 (quid pro quo exchange of benefits was essential
to the formation of workers' compensation programs).
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instituted primarily to benefit employees. 0 Under these systems, employees
benefit because employers are required to pay benefits to all employees who
suffer work-connected, disabling injuries. 51 The relative fault of the em-
ployer and the employee is of no consequence in determining eligibility for
benefits.5 2 In other words, the employee is automatically entitled53 to bene-
fits for all accidentally incurred disabilities that arise out of and in the
course of employment, 54 even when the accident was entirely the result of
the employee's own negligence. 55 Conversely, benefits are not increased
when the employer is entirely at fault.56
50. Bohlen, supra note 26, at 330 (declaring that society abhors the thought of the
possibility of throwing a whole family into the pauper class due to an accidental injury to the
head of the family, and therefore, the legislature intended that workers' compensation would
be a distinct gain to workmen).
51. Temporary total or permanent total benefits are awarded only for injuries which
cause disability. Ghiardi, supra note 4, at 151; Cochran, Workers' Compensation: Problems in
the Revision, Recommendation for the Future, 22 TULSA L.J. 425, 427 (1987). See also 1 A.
LARSON, supra note 6, § 2.40, at 10-11; Note, supra note 35, at 1643. An employee does not
receive compensation for loss of sensory perception, such as sight or smell, disease, disfigure-
ment, or pain and suffering, unless the condition affects employability. See, e.g., Genson v.
Bofors-Lakeway, Inc., 122 Mich. App. 470, 473, 478-79, 332 N.W.2d 507, 508, 511 (1983)
(benzidine exposure caused bladder cancer which was not then compensable because not pres-
ently disabling); McKinley v. Holiday Inn, 115 Mich. App. 160, 163-65, 320 N.W.2d 329,
331-32 (1982) (no workers' compensation benefits for rape of hotel maid unless she is dis-
abled). But see infra note 62 (explaining benefits for partial disability).
52. Comment, Workers' Compensation: Expanding the Intentional Tort Exception to
Include Willful, Wanton, and Reckless Employer Misconduct, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 890,
891-92 (1983); Comment, supra note 30, at 495; Handley v. Union Carbide Corp., 620 F.
Supp. 428, 433 (S.D. W. Va. 1985) (negligence is immaterial). Fault does become an issue,
however, if the employee intentionally injures himself. See, e.g., MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
418.305 (West 1985). See also Beauchamp, 427 Mich. at 12-13, 398 N.W.2d at 887 (the
employee is barred from collecting workers' compensation benefits if his injury is caused by his
own intentional and willful misconduct).
53. The employee is entitled to benefits simply by notifying the employer that he suf-
fered an accidental injury at work. If the employer contends that the injury is not work re-
lated, and thus is not compensable, the workers' compensation board will set a date for a
hearing or mediation. That decision can be appealed to the court of appeals and ultimately to
the supreme court of the state. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3-4-5, -6, -7, -8 (West Supp.
1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 418.801, .841, .847, .859 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988).
54. Bohlen, supra note 26, at 329; Note, supra note 35, at 1642. The statutes customa-
rily use the term "arising out of and in the course of" to indicate that workers' compensation
does not cover injuries which are not related to the employee's job. See also Ghiardi, supra
note 4, at 153.
55. Ghiardi, supra note 4, at 151; Comment, supra note 52, at 891; Comment, supra
note 30, at 495. Under the common law tort system, the employee could recover only if he
proved that the employer was negligent. Today, workers' compensation provides benefits when
there was no negligence, when the employer was negligent, or even if the employee was injured
as a result of his own negligence.
56. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 68.13, at 13-10 (intentional tort exception does
not encompass accidental injuries caused by "gross, wanton, wilful, deliberate, intentional,
reckless, culpable, or malicious negligence .... "). See also W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c)(2)(i)
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Workers' compensation statutes mandate that employers purchase in-
surance policies to finance the workers' compensation program. 57 The cost
of the insurance is included in the employer's production costs and is added
to the price of the product. 58 Thus, the cost of injury is distributed to con-
sumers rather than left to fall on the disabled employee. 59 The employee
benefits by receiving payment of his medical expenses and a quick, stan-
dardized income without the uncertainty, delay, and expense of litigation. 0
To obtain assured workers' compensation benefits, workers' compensa-
tion statutes require that the disabled employee relinquish the right to sue
for injuries caused by his employer's negligence6 l and agree to accept in-
come replacement benefits62 which are significantly lower than those he
might recover in a negligence action. 3 While the program typically pro-
(1983) (set out infra note 196). But see infra note 158 (several states provide a remedy within
the workers' compensation system for egregious employer misconduct).
57. Note, supra note 35, at 1642; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 39, § 80, at 531.
However, most states will allow the employer to self-insure if he can show that he has ade-
quate resources. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-5-1 (West 1981 & Supp. 1988) (in the
alternative, the employer may furnish proof to the workers' compensation board that he has
the financial ability to pay the employee directly); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 418.611, .701
(West 1985) (may also insure through the state accident fund).
58. Comment, supra note 4, at 454 (public purchases goods at increased prices and
absorbs the cost of work-related injuries).
59. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 3.20, at 17 (consumer, not public at large, provides
for compensation coverage); Comment, supra note 52, at 892. See also PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 29, § 80, at 573 & n.48 ("[T]he cost of the product should bear the blood of the
workman.").
60. See supra notes 26-39 and accompanying text (explaining the problems injured
employees faced under the common law negligence system).
61. Actually workers' compensation is a statutory provision which covers almost all
employers and employees, seldom allowing employees the right to choose whether they will
relinquish rights for assured compensation. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-2 (West Supp.
1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 418.111, .115, .118 (West Supp. 1988).
62. Michigan awards benefits on the relatively rare "wage loss" theory (a specified
percentage of his former weekly wages for as long as the employee is totally incapacitated and
a schedule of benefits for partially incapacitated employees). See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
418.351, .354, .361 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988). The "wage loss" theory prevents loss of work-
ers' compensation dollars on injuries which are not disabling and conserves administrative,
legal, and judicial resources because there is no need to determine the percentage of disability.
2 A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 57.140), at 10-77, -78. The majority of states provide a schedule
of benefits under which the injured worker receives the specified amount for a scheduled num-
ber of weeks with the percentage of impairment determining the compensation. Awards are
allowed for a greater number of weeks for more serious injuries. In other words, a particular
injury creates a conclusive presumption of a certain loss of earning ability. Id. § 57.14(c), at
10-56. However, an administrative problem often arises because the workers' compensation
board and the courts must spend considerable time evaluating the percentage of disability,
especially for problems which are difficult to diagnose, such as back injuries. Id. § 57.14(j), at
10-79, -80.
63. Note, supra note 35, at 1642. See also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 29, § 80, at
574. Workers' compensation is a compromise in which the employee receives "limited compen-
Parkhurst: Michigan Worker's Compensation Act:  The Intentional Tort Excepti
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1989
382 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23
vides full medical and rehabilitation coverage,6 4 the income is often set at a
subsistence level.6 5 The income replacement stipend is generally computed
as a percentage of the disabled employee's former income,66 but legislatures
usually set a ceiling" to control the cost of the system. 8
When the statutes were enacted, many employers argued that their
detriments under workers' compensation were much greater than their ben-
efits.69 First, the workers' compensation statute deprived the employer of his
common law defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and
the fellow-servant doctrine.70 In addition, the statute required the employer
to compensate employees for all work-connected, disabling injuries.71 The
employers' detriments under workers' compensation were substantial, con-
sidering the fact that the employers' three defenses were enabling them to
defeat seventy to ninety-four percent of the employees' negligence suits.72
sation, usually less than a jury verdict, in return for extended liability and assurance of pay-
ment." Id.
64. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-3-4 (West Supp. 1988) (entitled to medical care
while awaiting final determination of eligibility); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 418.315, .319
(West Supp. 1988) (entitled to medical care and prompt medical and vocational
rehabilitation).
65. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 2.50, at 11. The benefits will enable an employee to
avoid destitution; they will not support him in the manner to which he is accustomed to live.
See also ATLA, supra note 4, at 294. States may set benefits which are below a subsistence
level because they are related to out-dated price levels. Id.
66. Compensation is about two-thirds of the salary it replaces plus medical and rehabil-
itation costs. Note, supra note 35, at 1642 (citing Conley & Noble, Workers' Compensation
Reform: Challenge for the 80's, in 1 RESEARCH REPORT OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL WORK-
ERS' COMPENSATION TASK FORCE 9, 15, 18-19 (1979)). See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-3-8
(West 1981) (66 2h% for a maximum of 500 weeks). Michigan rates, however, are higher than
most states. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 418.351, .361 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988) (80%
of employee's average after tax wage for duration of total incapacity, and schedule of benefits
for partial incapacity).
67. See letter from Michigan Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation to All In-
surance Companies and Self-Insured Employers (Dec. 22, 1988) (maximum weekly benefits
for 1989 are $409.00) (on file in the Valparaiso University Law Review Office). See also IND.
CODE ANN. § 22-3-3-4(a), (b) (West 1981 & Supp. 1988) (weekly maximum of $384.00, total
maximum of $128,000 for injuries which occur between July 1, 1988 and July 1, 1989). The
statutory table provides lower benefits for injuries which occurred before July 1, 1988. Id.
68. If workers' compensation premiums are too high, employers cannot compete with
manufacturers from other states and they will go out of business or move to another state. See
generally infra note 151 and accompanying text (quoting MICHIGAN SENATE, SENATE FISCAL
AGENCY BILL ANALYSIS (May 26, 1987)).
69. See Comment, supra note 4, at 454-55. Many employers were strongly opposed to
the original workers' compensation acts because they feared that raising their prices to
purchase workers' compensation insurance would place them at a competitive disadvantage.
Id.
70. Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co., 427 Mich. 1, 8, 398 N.W.2d 882, 885 (1986).
71. Note, supra note 35, at 1642.
72. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. Employers won the negligence suits 70-
94% of the time. Id. But see Amchan, supra note 6, at 685 (perhaps some employers observed
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 3 [1989], Art. 4
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While employers initially opposed workers' compensation laws, they
now espouse such statutes due to changes in the law of torts.7 3 First, the
statute grants the employer immunity from common law negligence liability
for any work-related injury through a provision stating that worker's com-
pensation is the exclusive remedy for work-connected injuries. 74 The exclu-
sivity provision is a significant benefit because it saves the employer the
time and cost of litigation.75 In addition, it insulates the employer from all
a trend toward enhanced recovery at common law and supported workers' compensation as a
way to block that trend).
73. Currently employers are less likely to win negligence suits due to abrogation of
their traditional defenses and enhanced tort recovery. Note, supra note 35, at 1645 & nn.28-
29. Comparative negligence has replaced contributory negligence in many states. Id. In addi-
tion, assumption of risk and the fellow-servant doctrine have been discarded in many jurisdic-
tions. Id.
74. See ALA. CODE § 25-5-53 (1986); ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.055 (1984); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 23-1022 (Supp. 1987) (allows employees to elect whether to accept workers'
compensation coverage or reject it and retain their common law rights); ARK. CODE OF 1987
ANN. § 11-9-105 (1987); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601 (West Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-
42-102 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-284 (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §
2304 (1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.11 (West 1981 & Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-
11 (1988); HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-5 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 72-211 (1973); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 48, para. 138.5 (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-6 (West Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 85.20 (West 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501(b) (Supp. 1987); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
342.375, .395 (Baldwin 1986) (allows election); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032 (West 1985);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 4 (Supp. 1988) (if employee elects workers' compensation
coverage); MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 15 (1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 152, § 24
(1988) (if employee elects workers' compensation coverage); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
418.131 (West Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.031 (West 1966); MISS. CODE ANN. §
71-3-9 (1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.120(1) (Vernon Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-
71-411 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-148 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 616.370 (Michie
1986); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 281.12 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-1 (West 1988) (if
the employee elects workers' compensation coverage); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-9 (1987);
N.Y. WORK. CohiP. LAW § 11 (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (1985);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-08 (1985); 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. § 4121.80 (Baldwin); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 12 (West Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.018 (1987); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 77, § 481 (Purdon Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-29-17 (1986); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 42-1-540 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (if employee elects workers' compensation coverage);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 62-3-2 (1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-108 (Supp. 1988);
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-60
(1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 622 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-40 (1987); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 51.04.010 (Supp. 1989); W. VA. CODE § 23-3-6 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
102.03 (West 1988); Wyo. STAT. § 27-14-104 (1987).
75. See generally 2 A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 68.15, at 13-47 to -68. It would be
inequitable to force employers to compensate for all degrees of employee negligence, but allow
workers to pursue the more generous tort action for the gross negligence of employers. Legisla-
tures therefore provided employers with immunity from all negligence suits in exchange for
extending benefits to employees for all negligent, work-related accidents. Id. See also Reed
Tool Co. v. Copelin, 689 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. 1985). Subjecting employers to liability for acci-
dental injuries, in addition to requiring them to provide workers' compensation, would under-
mine the workers' compensation system's effectiveness. Id. at 407.
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degrees of negligence, including gross, willful, and wanton negligence.76
Second, the minimal benefits keep the program cost low and motivate em-
ployees to return to work at the earliest opportunity, thus further reducing
employers' costs for employers' injuries.7
Abusing the limited liability provisions under workers' compensation
statutes, certain employers intentionally committed grievous torts towards
their employees78 and claimed the exclusive remedy provision as a shield if
an injured employee sued.79 In response, courts denied immunity to those
callous employers by holding that intentional torts constituted an exception
to the exclusive remedy provision.80 As recently as 1986, however, the Su-
76. In fairness to all parties, workers' compensation statutes even-handedly cover all
degrees of negligence of both employers and employees. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 6, §
68.13, at 13-10. Workers' compensation immunity covers "gross, wanton, willful, deliberate,
intentional, reckless, culpable or malicious negligence, breach of statute, or other misconduct."
Id.
77. ATLA, supra note 4, at 294; 1 A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 2.60, at 12 (suggesting
that higher benefits might encourage malingering).
78. See, e.g., Serna v. Statewide Contractors, 6 Ariz. App. 12, 429 P.2d 504 (1967);
Fowler v. Southern Wiring Co., 104 Ga. App. 401, 122 S.E.2d 157 (1961), rev'd, 217 Ga. 727,
124 S.E.2d 739 (1962); Johnson v. Mountaire Farms, 305 Md. 246, 503 A.2d 708 (1984);
Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., 161 W. Va. 695, 246 S.E.2d 907 (1978). In Fowler, the company
president ordered a worker to work in an acid vat when the employee refused to disclose the
names of workers who attended a union organization meeting. Fowler, 104 Ga. App. at 402,
122 S.E.2d at 159. The employer did not tell the worker to wear rubber gloves. Id. at 402, 122
S.E.2d at 159. The employee usually worked in another area of the building and did not know
that he should wear protective gloves. Id. at 402, 122 S.E.2d at 159. In one of the three cases
which were consolidated in Mandolidis, a foreman ordered an employee to work on a table
saw which safety inspectors had tagged unsafe to use because it lacked a safety guard.
Mandolidis, 161 W. Va. at 707, 246 S.E.2d at 915. The guardless saw cut off two of the
employee's fingers and part of his hand. Id. at 707, 246 S.E.2d at 914. In Serna, two construc-
tion workers suffocated when 25-foot deep construction ditch collapsed and buried them.
Serna, 6 Ariz. App. at 13, 429 P.2d at 505. Safety officials had repeatedly warned the com-
pany that the ditch was unsafe and one of the decedents had been buried waist-deep in an
earlier cave-in. Id. at 14, 429 P.2d at 506. The employer did not slope the sides and place
ladders every 20 feet as recommended. Id. at 14, 429 P.2d at 506. In Johnson, a 16 year-old
boy was electrocuted by a sump pump which the employer had previously reported to OSHA
as having been repaired when in fact it had not been. Johnson, 305 Md. at 248, 503 A.2d at
709.
79. It is difficult to estimate how many employees did not pursue a common law negli-
gence action because they thought the exclusive remedy doctrine prohibited any suits for their
injuries. See, e.g., People v. Film Recovery, Nos. 84 C 5064, 83 C 11091 (Cir. Ct. of Cook
County, Ill. June 14, 1985). The employers were convicted of murder when a worker died as
the result of exposure to chemical fumes. Most of the employees were undocumented Mexican
and Polish immigrants who spoke little English. The employees had frequently complained of
fumes, to no avail. The chemical bottles contained a warning, but the employers hired only
workers who could read little English and removed warning labels from bottles. See sources
and description of these unpublished cases infra note 183.
80. See, e.g., Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 108 Tex. 96, 185 S.W. 556
(1916); Richardson v. The Fair, Inc., 124 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). See also Note,
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preme Court of Michigan had not ruled whether Michigan workers' com-
pensation law included an intentional tort exception.81
B. The Supreme Court of Michigan Recognized the Intentional Tort
Exception
In December 1986, the Supreme Court of Michigan established the
intentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy provision in Beauchamp
v. Dow Chemical Co..82 Prior to Beauchamp, the Michigan Court of Ap-
peals had issued inconsistent holdings in response to the question of whether
Michigan workers' compensation contained an exception for intentional
torts.83 In Beauchamp, the court reviewed the history and goals of workers'
compensation' 84 reviewed earlier Michigan decisions,85 considered the posi-
tions taken by other jurisdictions, 8 and concluded that the legislature did
not intend to immunize employers from liability for intentional torts.8
Intentional Employer Torts: A Matter for the California Legislature, 15 U.S.F. L. REv. 651,
673 (1981). Employers' intentionally tortious conduct would be deterred by the possibility of
civil suits with their potentially large punitive damage awards. Id.
81. Neither the Michigan Legislature nor the Supreme Court of Michigan had ex-
pressly exempted intentional torts from the exclusive remedy rule. See infra note 83.
82. 427 Mich. 1, 398 N.W.2d 882 (1986). Ronald Beauchamp, a research chemist,
alleged physical and mental injury caused by workplace exposure to "agent orange". Id. at 5-
6, 398 N.W.2d at 883. He alleged that his employer, Dow Chemical Company, intentionally
misrepresented and fraudulently concealed the potential danger, intentionally assaulted him,
intentionally inflicted emotional distress, and breached its contract to provide safe working
conditions. Id. at 5-6, 398 N.W.2d at 883. The Supreme Court of Michigan held that the
contract case was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of workers' compensation, but
remanded for further proceedings on the intentional tort claims. Id. at 27, 398 N.W.2d at 894.
83. Although the Supreme Court of Michigan had not addressed the intentional tort
exception, the Michigan Court of Appeals had. See, e.g., Shutt v. Lado, 138 Mich. App. 433,
360 N.W.2d 214 (1984) (allowed an employee to sue for false imprisonment and intentional
infliction of emotional distress in addition to settling the assault and battery claims when her
employer locked her in his office and beat her); Barnes v. Double Seal Glass Co., 129 Mich.
App. 66, 341 N.W.2d 812 (1983) (allowed parents of deceased employee a separate right of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress when they alleged that the employer al-
lowed their 16 year-old son to die because death benefits were less expensive than workers'
compensation benefits, but workers' compensation exclusivity barred any claims on behalf of
the deceased); Genson v. Bofors-Lakeway, Inc., 122 Mich. App. 470, 478, 322 N.W.2d 507,
510 (1983) (stated that there was no intentional tort exception in Michigan). See also Leo-
nard v. All-Pro Equities, Inc., 149 Mich. App. 1, 386 NW.2d 159 (1986). Leonard, decided
the same year as Beauchamp, stated that the existence of an intentional tort exception was
questionable, but if there was one, the true intentional tort test would be the standard. Id. at
5-7, 386 N.W.2d at 161-62.
84. Beauchamp, 427 Mich. at 6-11, 398 N.W.2d 884-86.
85. Id. at 11-14, 398 N.W.2d at 886-88.
86. Id. at 17-25, 398 N.W.2d at 889-91.
87. Id. at 14-17, 398 N.W.2d at 888-89. The court had to utilize a circuituous method
due to the statutory langauge. See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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The decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan recognizing the inten-
tional tort exception was consistent with judicial action in other states.88
Various courts had allowed employees to avoid workers' compensation ex-
clusivity and sue at common law for an intentional tort on three separate
theories. The first and most frequently used theory8" stated that the inher-
ently nonaccidental nature of an intentional tort removed it from the area
of workers' compensation's exclusive coverage. 90 Second, courts held that
the intentionally tortious act did not arise out of and in the course of em-
ployment and therefore the worker's compensation exclusivity rule did not
bar such a common law tort action.91 The third theory held that the inten-
tional tort severed the employer-employee relationship. 9 In Beauchamp,
the Supreme Court of Michigan relied on the nonaccidental nature of an
intentional tort.9" Although the word "accident" had been deleted from the
Michigan Worker's Disability Compensation Act, the court evaluated legis-
lative intent and held that intentional torts were outside the exclusivity
provision.94
Beauchamp had necessarily claimed that the injury was accidental
when he filed for and received workers' compensation benefits.95 The valid-
ity of allowing an employee to claim benefits and subsequently file an inten-
tional tort action is one of the disputed points in the intentional tort contro-
versy.96 Some courts have allowed the employee to process his workers'
88. Beauchamp, 427 Mich. at 18, 398 N.W.2d at 890 & n.44; Ghiardi, supra note 4,
at 153. See also Evans v. Yankeetown Dock Corp., 491 N.E.2d 969, 973 (Ind. 1986); National
Can Corp. v. Jovanovich, 503 N.E.2d 1224, 1232 (Ind. App. 1987).
89. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 68.11 at 13-2; Vieweg, supra note 25, at 424 (the
nonaccidental nature of the injury is the most notable theory).
90. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 68.11 at 13-2 (an intentional tort is, by its nature,
not an accident); Note, supra note 80, at 674 n.118. See also National Can, 503 N.E.2d at
1232 (denying exception for intentional torts would pervert workers' compensation act's pur-
pose). But see id. at 1234 (Conover, P.J., concurring: only the legislature should make such
policy decisions). See also Shearer v. Homestake Mining Co., 557 F. Supp. 549, 553 (D.S.D.
1983) (to utilize this theory, the statute must use the word "accident" rather than "injury").
91. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 68.11, at 13-4; Note, supra note 80, at 674. See,
e.g., Magliulo v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 778, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621, 635 (1975);
Evans, 491 N.E.2d at 973; Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d
608, 433 N.E.2d 572 (1982).
92. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 68.11 at 13-2. The theory was highly fictitious
because seriously injured employees who were only partially disabled often continued to work
for the employer. See also Shearer, 557 F. Supp. at 553.
93. Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co., 427 Mich. 1, 10-11, 398 N.W.2d 882, 886 (1986).
94. Beauchamp, 427 Mich. at 10, 398 N.W.2d at 886. The court concluded that the
word "accident" had been deleted from the act to allow employees to collect for occupational
disease, not to immunize employers for intentional torts. Id. at 10, 398 N.W.2d at 886.
95. Id. at 10, 398 N.W.2d at 886.
96. The theory is that an employee may not file for workers' compensation, alleging the
injury was accidental, and then file a common law suit, alleging the same injury was intention-
ally inflicted. See, e.g., Carter v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 2d 350, 298 P.2d 598, 601
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compensation claim, collect benefits, and still sue for an intentional tort,97
but other courts have held that the employee must elect his remedy.98
Recognizing the intentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy rule
did not resolve Beauchamp. A question remained concerning the standard
for determining when an employer had committed an intentional tort.
Should the court apply the true intentional tort test99 or the substantial
certainty test?100
C. The Supreme Court of Michigan Defined the Standard for the Inten-
tional Tort Exception
In Beauchamp, the Supreme Court of Michigan also clarified the
proper standard for determining whether an employer had committed an
intentional tort. The court evaluated the available standards,101 considered
positions taken by other jurisdictions,0 2 and held that the appropriate stan-
dard was the substantial certainty test."0 3 The decision constituted a rever-
sal because the Michigan Court of Appeals had stated, in dicta, that if
there was an intentional tort exception in Michigan, the test would be the
true intentional tort test.'04
The propriety of adopting a test which is less restrictive than true in-
tent has been a hotly disputed issue among commentators in recent years.
Some commentators focus on the need to deter irresponsible employer mis-
(1956) (dishwasher was assaulted by owner); Burgess v. Holloway Constr. Co., 123 Mich.
App. 505, 332 N.W.2d 584 (1983) (litigant's husband was fatally shot by a co-employee);
Bardere v. Zafir, 102 A.D.2d 422, 425, 477 N.Y.S.2d 131, (1984) (worker injured on machine
which employer had altered to increase production).
97. See, e.g., Shearer, 557 F. Supp. at 551; Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 101 N.J. 161, 187, 501 A.2d 506, 519 (1985) (allowing set-off for benefits previously
paid); Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 90, 472 N.E.2d 1046 (1984). See also Note,
supra note 35, at 1653 n.80 (stating that we should not force the employee to choose between
an assured partial recovery and an uncertain full recovery).
98. See cases cited supra note 96.
99. The true intentional tort test requires the plaintiff to present convincing evidence
that the employer intended both the act and the resultant injury. See supra note 6.
100. Under the substantial certainty test, the plaintiff must prove that the employer
intended the act which caused injury, but he need only prove that the employer was substan-
tially certain that the injury would occur. See supra note 7.
101. Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co., 427 Mich. 1, 19-25, 398 N.W.2d 882, 891-93
(1986).
102. Id. at 19-25, 398 N.W.2d at 891-93.
103. Id. at 25, 398 N.W.2d at 893. See also supra note 7.
104. Leonard v. All-Pro Equities, Inc., 149 Mich. App. 1, 386 N.W.2d 159 (1986) (hold-
ing that the Supreme Court of Michigan had not ruled that there was an exception, but if
there was, it was the true intentional tort test and the plaintiff could not meet that test). See
also Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co., 140 Mich. App. 699, 364 N.W.2d 286 (1984).
Parkhurst: Michigan Worker's Compensation Act:  The Intentional Tort Excepti
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1989
388 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23
conduct and advocate a willful and wanton negligence standard.10 5 Others
favor adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Torts' definition which pro-
motes the substantial certainty test.106 Still others declare that workers'
compensation was designed as a quid pro quo exchange of benefits, and the
system must abide by the true intentional tort test rather than enlarging the
exception by comparing it to the contemporary tort law standard. 107 Those
favoring the true intentional tort standard argue that a more lenient stan-
dard would upset the balance which the legislature originally established'0 8
and might disadvantage employers so greatly that the workers' compensa-
tion system would collapse. 109
Commentators who support the adoption of a more lenient standard,
such as substantial certainty, point out that workers' compensation laws
were enacted to provide injured employees more equitable compensation
than the common law negligence theory."a0 Workers' compensation pres-
ently operates to the disadvantage of employees due to changes in tort law
since the statutes were enacted."' These commentators argue that the sub-
stantial certainty standard should be adopted to provide fair compensation
to employees, 1 2 consistent with the original goals of workers' compensa-
105. See generally Comment, supra note 52, at 904-05. The difference between negli-
gence and willful torts is one of kind, not merely of degree. Id. The actor's state of mind is the
crucial element and willful negligence is more akin to intentional torts than to mere negli-
gence. Id.
106. Case Note, supra note 7, at 520-22 (approving the court's decision in Reed Tool
Co. v. Copelin, 689 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. 1985)).
107. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 68.15, at 13-68; Epstein, supra note 28, at 818 (must
limit the intentional tort exception to the narrowest possible scope).
108. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 68.15, at 13-68 (system requires an arbitrary rule,
even if it produces "injustice" in some marginal cases).
109. The National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws omitted "lim-
ited employer liability" from the list of modern workmens' compensation objectives in its 1972
report. See Vieweg, supra note 25, at 422. That omission may signal the demise of workers'
compensation because the system cannot survive without a strong exclusive remedy system. Id.
at 423, 434. Cf. Ghiardi, supra note 4, at 179 (despite warnings that recognition of imagina-
tive tort attacks on the exclusive remedy doctrine could undermine workers' compensation, the
system is presently holding its own due to strict judicial interpretation of the intentional tort
exception). See also Reed Tool, 689 S.W.2d at 407 (the continued effectiveness of the work-
ers' compensation system depends on maintenance of a strong exclusive remedy provision).
110. Bohyer, The Exclusivity Rule: Dual Capacity and the Reckless Employer, 47
MONT. L. REv. 157, 173-75 (1986) (advocates allowing tort actions for willful, wanton and
reckless conduct); Comment, Exclusive Remedy Provisions in the Workers' Compensation
System: Unwarranted Immunity for Employers' Wilful and Wanton Misconduct, 31 S.D.L.
REv. 157 (1985). The workers' compensation acts were also designed to promote a safe work
environment. See infra notes 152-53 & 166 and accompanying text.
111. Although benefits are swift and certain, they are much smaller than the verdicts
available in negligence suits. See Comment, supra note 4, at 455; Comment, supra note 52, at
906; ATLA, supra note 4, at 295 (author hopes we will see the end of the exclusive remedy
rule).
112. Note, supra note 35, at 1654 (workers' compensation benefits which merely enable
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tion.'" In cases where the exclusive remedy provision operates to insulate
the employer from liability for either gross negligence or willful and wanton
negligence,114 the minimal benefits available under workers' compensation
allow the employer to injure employees carelessly and with impunity.11 5
In addition to those commentator's recommendations, courts in other
states have evaluated the tests and reached differing conclusions oi the ap-
propriateness of adopting the substantial certainty test. Some of those deci-
sions hold that "substantial certainty" is simply a specie of evidence and
not a separate test. 1 ' Others define intentional torts as including those
which meet the "substantial certainty" standard in accord with the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts.117 Finally, some courts have declined employees'
requests to extend the exception's definition.11 8 Some judges have stated
that enlarging the exception was a matter which the legislature should ad-
dress, rather than the court.119 Despite the commentators' recommendations
and the plaintiffs' requests, few courts have adopted the substantial cer-
tainty test.120
disabled employees to stave off destitution are inequitable).
113. Id. at 1446-48 (would also serve the original deterrent purpose by allowing recov-
ery more frequently).
114. Comment, supra note 52, at 904-05. Workers' compensation is a strict liability or
no-fault plan which covers both the employer's and the employee's willful and wanton negli-
gence. Id.
115. See generally Bohyer, supra note 110, at 161; Comment, supra note 110 at 162.
The increase in the insurance premium is not enough to serve as a deterrent. Id. The costs of
coverage for grossly negligent employers' claims are spread over the non-negligent employers
too. See Amchan, supra note 6, at 687.
116. See, e.g., Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161, 178, 501 A.2d
505, 514 (1985).
117. Shearer v. Homestake Mining Co., 557 F. Supp. 549, 555 (D.S.D. 1983) (constru-
ing statutory exception); Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 90, 95, 472 N.E.2d 1046, 1051
(1984) (judicially created exception); Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 689 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.
1985) (defining statutorily created exception as substantial certainty).
118. Johnson v. Mountaire Farms, 305 Md. 246, 503 A.2d 708 (1986) (declining to
follow Blankenship and Mandolidis in extending the definition of an intentional tort to include
substantial certainty). Id. at 252-53, 503 A.2d at 711.
119. Some judges state that extension of existing law involves policy considerations and
is properly addressed by the legislature rather than by the courts. See, e.g., National Can
Corp. v. Jovanovich, 503 N.E.2d 1224, 1234 (Ind. App. 1987) (Conover, P.J., concurring).
120. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 68.11, at 13-8; Ghiardi, supra note 24, at 157, 160.
But see Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161, 501 A.2d 505 (1985)
"[W]hatever formulation is used represents a conscious effort to impose severe restrictions on
the exception, bringing it as close to 'subjective desire to injure' as the nuances of language
will permit, while at the same time recognizing the problems of proof inherent in any attempt
to demonstrate subjective intent." Id. at 173, 501 A.2d at 511. After making this statement,
the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the substantial certainty test and defined intent in
accord with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. Id. at 178, 501 A.2d at 514.
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III. CODIFICATION OF THE INTENTIONAL TORT EXCEPTION TO THE
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY RULE OF THE MICHIGAN WORKER'S DISABILITY
COMPENSATION ACT
A. The Michigan Legislature Codified an Ambiguous Standard for De-
termining an Intentional Tort
The Michigan Legislature codified the intentional tort exception in an
amendment to the Worker's Disability Compensation Act on May 14,
1987.121 The amendment was enacted just five months after Beauchamp.22
The legislature's committee minutes, as well as the timing of the amend-
ment, suggest that the amendment was a response to Beauchamp.1 23 How-
121. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.131 (West 1988) (set out infra note 128). The Act
also amended other portions of the Michigan Worker's Disability Compensation Act. First, the
amendment redefined "disability" and "reasonable employment" in a manner calculated to
reduce workers' compensation costs to industry and government. The disability section states:
As used in this chapter, "disability" means a limitation of an employee's wage earning
capacity in work suitable to his or her qualifications and training resulting from a per-
sonal injury or work related disease. The establishment of disability does not create a
presumption of wage loss.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.301(4) (West Supp. 1988).
The reasonable employment section reads as follows:
"Reasonable employment", as used in this section, means work that is within the em-
ployee's capacity to perform that poses no clear and proximate threat to that employee's
health and safety, and that is within a reasonable distance from that employee's resi-
dence. The employee's capacity to perform shall not be limited to jobs in work suitable to
his or her qualifications and training.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.301(9) (West Supp. 1988).
The amendment also provides that persons receiving disability benefits shall be given priority
by the Michigan Employment Security Commission and directs the bureau to terminate bene-
fits if the employee refuses reasonable employment.
(6) A carrier shall notify the Michigan employment security commission of the name of
any injured employee who is unemployed and to which the carrier is paying benefits
under this act.
(7) The Michigan employment security commission shall give priority to finding employ-
ment for those persons whose names are supplied to the commission under subsection (6).
(8) The Michigan employment security commission shall notify the bureau in writing of
the name of any employee who refuses any bona fide offer of reasonable employment.
Upon notification to the bureau, the bureau shall notify the carrier who shall terminate
the benefits of the employee pursuant to subsection (5)(a).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.301(6)-(8) (West Supp. 1988).
The final section of the amendment provides for co-ordination of benefits, reducing benefits if
the disabled employee is receiving benefits such as social security, pension or retirement pay-
ments. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.354(1) (West Supp. 1988).
122. Beauchamp was decided December 23, 1986. Inclusion of the intentional tort codi-
fication is notable because the legislature could have let Beauchamp stand and waited to see if
employees would file numerous or frivolous suits in an attempt to enlarge the intentional tort
exception. Instead, the legislature codified and thereby limited the exception at the first
opportunity.
123. During meetings of the Senate Committee on Human Resources and Senior Citi-
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ever, the statutory language is ambiguous, 124 neither confirming nor clearly
overruling Beaucharnp.125 The phraseology used in the statute is neither the
traditional language of the true intentional tort standard, 128 nor that which
is usually associated with the substantial certainty test.127 Instead, the stat-
utory language is a hybrid which combines words and phrases commonly
associated with each test.128
An early draft of the amendment included language that would have
clearly established the true intentional tort test because it stated that in
order to be chargeable with an intentional tort, the employer must deliber-
ately intend the act as well as the resultant injury, disability, or death. 29
zens, which sponsored the workers' compensation amendment, the committee heard from Ed
Welch, Director of the Worker's Disability Bureau; and representatives from the Michigan
Construction Industry; the National Federation of Independent Businesses; the Employers' As-
sociation of Detroit; the Michigan Merchants; the Michigan State Chamber [of Commerce];
the AFL-CIO; and the United Auto Workers. All referred directly to either the Beauchamp
decision or the exclusive remedy provision and voiced their concerns regarding the proposed
amendment. See MICHIGAN SENATE, MINUTES OF MEETINGS OF THE CoMMITTEE ON HUMAN
RESOURCES AND SENIOR CITIZENS (Feb. 24, Mar. 3, and Mar. 10, 1987). In a memorandum
to the Michigan Senate, Senators Dillingham and DeGrow reported that it had been the sen-
ate's goal to restore the integrity of the exclusive remedy. See Memorandum to the Michigan
Senate from Senate Bill 67 Conferees Fred Dillingham and Dan DeGrow (May 14, 1987). A
brief summary to the Senate Republican Staff stated that Beauchamp was reversed. See
Memorandum to Senate Republican Staff from Jurgen Skoppek (May 19, 1987). But see infra
note 125 (the legislature specifically stated that Franks v. White Pine Copper Division was
erroneously decided but made no such statement about Beauchamp).
124. See supra note 14 and text accompanying notes 14-18.
125. The amendment specifically overruled Franks v. White Pine Copper Div., 422
Mich. 636, 375 N.W.2d 715 (1985). See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 354(17) (West Supp.
1988). The statute, however, does not mention Beauchamp by name. See supra note 123 (stat-
ing that Beauchamp is reversed). Perhaps the Michigan Legislature, like Ohio and West Vir-
ginia, attempted to adopt a strict test, but allow an. exception for grievous employer miscon-
duct. See infra notes 162 & 196 (setting out the statutes) and notes 173 & 201 (describing the
type of grievous misconduct) and accompanying text.
126. "Deliberate intent" or "specific intent" would indicate the true intentional tort test
if the amendment did not define it further. See Ghiardi, supra note 4, at 155.
127. See supra note 7.
128. The statute reads:
Sec. 131 (1) The right to the recovery of benefits as provided in this act shall be the
employee's exclusive remedy against the employer for a personal injury or occupational
disease. The only exception to this exclusive remedy is an intentional tort. An intentional
tort shall exist only when an employee is injured as a result of a deliberate act of the
employer, and the employer specifically intended an injury. An employer shall be deemed
to have intended to injure if the employer had actual knowledge that an injury was cer-
tain to occur and willfully disregarded that knowledge. The issue of whether an act was
an intentional tort shall be a question of law for the court. This subsection shall not
enlarge or reduce rights under law.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.131 (West Supp. 1988).
129. The February 18, 1987 proposal read:
Sec. 131 (1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) and section 132, the right to
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That language would plainly indicate that the supporters of the bill in-
tended to reverse the portion of Beauchamp that adopted the substantial
certainty test, 30 but would affirm the holding that the Michigan workers'
compensation system contains an intentional tort exception to the exclusive
remedy provision.13' However, the legislature altered the definition of an
intentional tort before enacting the bill, and created the ambiguous defini-
tion. '3 The change in the statutory language and the inclusion of the word
"certain" and the term "willfully disregards" implies that the legislature
contemplated a strict test but did not intend to totally reject Beauchamp."'s
The legislature may have codified the test's definition merely to prevent
subsequent enlargement of the exception by judicial decision."' The Su-
the recovery of benefits as provided in this act shall be the employee's exclusive remedy
against the employer for any physical or mental injury, regardless of the source of the
injury or the manner in which the injury occurred, and the employer shall not be liable
for civil damages under any other act or at common law with regard to a physical or
mental injury.
Sec. 132 (1) Where the employer deliberately intended both the acts giving rise to such
injury, disability, or death and intended the resultant injury, disability, or death, the
employee or the employee's personal representative shall be permitted an action for civil
damages as a result of the employer's intentional tort.
(2) The filing of a claim for, or receipt of, any benefits pursuant to this act precludes an
employee, the employee's spouse, dependents, or estate from any other remedy including
an action for civil damages as provided in subsection (1) against the employer for the
same injury, disease, or death.
(3) Any claim of an intentional tort shall be brought within 2 years after the employee's
death or the date on which the employee knew or through the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have known of the injury, disease, or condition, whichever date occurs
first.
S. BILL 67, 84th Leg. Sess. (Feb. 18, 1987) (introduced by Senators Dillingham, DeGrow, et
al.).
130. The first rule of statutory construction is that the legislative intent governs. The
court must construe the statute if it is ambiguous, but will not advance its own interpretation if
the statutory language is clear. See Franks v. White Pine Copper Div., 422 Mich. 636, 670,
375 N.W.2d 715, 730 (1985).
131. Id. The legislature would affirm the existence of an intentional tort exception by
codifying, but rejects the substantial certainty test by defining an intentional tort differently,
even if it did not expressly overrule Beauchamp.
132. See supra notes 128 & 129 and accompanying text.
133. Michigan acted in accord with other state legislatures. See infra notes 162 & 196
and accompanying text (Ohio and West Virginia also amended their statutes and created a
restrictive test after their state supreme courts adopted more lenient tests). The only difference
is that Michigan did not wait several years to act, allowing increased litigation during the
interim.
134. When codifying the intentional tort exception, the Ohio and West Virginia Legisla-
tures provided exceptions for the particular types of cases that their courts had addressed when
they adopted the more lenient standard. The statutory exceptions prevent employees from in-
stigating suits in an attempt to enlarge the exception by judicial decision. See infra note 163
(describing the cases in which the Ohio courts adopted the substantial certainty test) and 164
(describing the types of intentional tort cases which are clearly prohibited by the Ohio amend-
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preme Court of Michigan stated in Beauchamp that the substantial cer-
tainty test is susceptible to enlargement of substantial risk. 35 Although the
court did not define substantial risk, the tone of the discussion clearly indi-
cates that the court was prohibiting further expansion of the exception. The
court cautioned that Beauchamp was not to be construed as merely one step
in broadening the exception, "30 since successive broadening decisions would
eventually cause the exception to swallow up the exclusive remedy rule.137
Construing the intentional tort exception too broadly would subject employ-
ers to double jeopardy: employers would have to provide workers' compen-
sation benefits for injuries caused by even gross employee negligence,"28 yet
would have to defend common law negligence actions and pay judgments
for injuries involving employer negligence."' By codifying the definition,
the legislature prohibited further expansion of the standard and protected
the employer from the possibility of this form of double liability.140
The amendment also precluded employees from attempting to enlarge
the exception by requiring the plaintiff-employee to prove that the employer
had actual knowledge that the injury was certain to occur.14' Thus, plain-
ment). See also infra note 201 (describing the case in which the West Virginia court adopted
a more lenient standard for the intentional tort exception).
135. See Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co., 427 Mich. 1, 25-26, 398 N.W.2d 882, 893
(1986). Neither the Michigan Supreme Court nor Prosser defined substantial risk; apparently
the court was merely cautioning against further enlargement of the exception.
136. See id. at 25-26, 398 N.W.2d at 893. See also Boyer v. Louisville Ladder Co., 157
Mich. App. 716, 403 N.W.2d 210 (1987). Boyer was the only case decided by the Michigan
Court of Appeals during the interval between the time the Michigan Supreme Court adopted
the substantial certainty test and the date the Michigan Legislature codified the intentional
tort exception. The court found that the plaintiff-employee's injury in a fall caused by his
employer's failure to provide the promised safety cable for scaffold did not constitute an inten-
tional tort and granted the employer's motion for summary disposition. Id. at 720, 403
N.W.2d at 212. "A result is intended if the act is done with the purposes of accomplishing the
result or with knowledge that to a substantial certainty such a result will ensue." Id. at 719,
403 N.W.2d at 211. One case, of course, does not prove that subsequent decisions would not
have enlarged the exception.
137. See generally National Can Corp. v. Jovanovich, 503 N.E.2d 1224, 1234 (Ind.
App. 1987) (Conover, P.J., concurring: unless the legislature amends the statute, exclusivity
extends even to intentional torts); Beauchamp, 427 Mich. at 25-26, 398 N.W.2d at 893.
138. See generally 2A A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 68.13, at 13-10 to -44.
139. Id. See also Shearer v. Homestake Mining Co., 557 F. Supp. 549, 555 (D.S.D.
1983) (too broad an interpretation would upset the system's balance); Griffin v. George's, Inc.,
267 Ark. 91, 97, 589 S.W.2d 24, 27 (1979) (construing the intentional tort exception expan-
sively would subvert the system's goal of spreading the cost of industrial accidents over the
public as a whole).
140. See supra notes 19 & 22 and accompanying text (explaining rules of statutory
construction).
141. See MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 418.131 (West Supp. 1988) (set out supra note
128). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 784 (5th ed. 1983) defining knowledge as:
Acquaintance with fact or truth . . . actual knowledge, notice or information; assurance
of fact or proposition founded on perception by senses, or intuition; clear perception of
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tiffs may not meet their burden of proof by alleging that the employer had
constructive knowledge.142 The combination of the "actual knowledge" and
"specific intent" requirements suggests that the legislature intended to
adopt the restrictive true intentional tort test.1 3
The legislature also provided that the court should determine as a
question of law whether an intentional tort exists, thereby further re-
straining attempts to expand the intentional tort exception.' 44 The provision
enables the court to dismiss the case or issue a summary judgment in ap-
propriate situations.145 Employers thus avoid problems of excessive jury
sympathy and identification with injured employees.'46 The Michigan Leg-
islature's decision to make the intentional tort determination a question of
law further curtailed the expansion of the intentional exception.
Although the amendment to the Worker's Disability Compensation
Act is ambiguous it at least units the intentional tort exception to the sub-
that which exists, or of truth, fact or duty; firm belief; miscellaneous information and
circumstances which engender belief to moral certainty or induce state of mind that one
considers that he knows; notice or knowledge sufficient to excite attention and put person
on guard and call for inquiry.
Id.
142. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 284 (5th ed. 1983), defining constructive knowl-
edge in this manner: "If one by exercise of reasonable care would have known a fact, he is
deemed to have had constructive knowledge of such fact; e.g., matters of public record." Id.
143. In each case, the legislature is choosing the strictest available standard. See supra
note 12 and accompanying text (explaining that the true intentional tort test is a more strin-
gent standard than the substantial certainty test).
144. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.131(1) (West Supp. 1988) (set out supra note
128).
145. This provision promotes the goal of reducing litigation costs by permitting early
dismissal. See Note, In the Wake of Mandolidis: A Case Study of Recent Trials Brought
Under the Mandolidis Theory-Courts Are Grappling With Procedural Uncertainties and Ju-
ries Are Awarding Exorbitant Damages for Plaintiffs, 84 W. VA. L. REV. 893 (1982). In
West Virginia, courts were reluctant to dismiss cases or issue summary judgment because
Mandolidis suggested that the determination was a jury question. Id. at 928. The West Vir-
ginia amendment includes a section expressly allowing dismissal or summary judgment. See
W. VA. CODE § 22-4-2(c)(2)(iii)(B) (1985) (set out infra note 196). Accord 1986 OHIO
LEGIS. SERV. § 4121.80(C) (Baldwin) (set out infra note 162).
146. Jurors may be confused by jury instructions or they may choose to ignore them.
See Note, supra note 145, at 915 n.157. In an affidavit, a former juror reported experiencing
the kind of problems which are inherent in a jury trial. During deliberation, she admitted to
being confused about the nature of punitive damages, but other jurors dissuaded her from
asking the judge to explain because, they said, that would make them all look stupid. Id. The
others told her that they must grant punitive damages because the case involved the coal
mining industry and would open the way for other miners to get more than workers' compen-
sation limited benefits. Id. The other jurors also said the plaintiff would need a large damage
award to pay his attorney fees and to reimburse the workers' compensation fund for benefits he
had received. Id. Finally, while this juror was in the restroom, the other jurors voted to grant a
large punitive damages award. Id. See infra note 200 for a summary of the facts in Cline, the
case involved. Cline v. Joy Mfg. Co., 310 S.E.2d 835 (W. Va. 1983).
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stantial certainty test. Yet the statutory language requiring specific intent
and allowing the court to determine whether an intentional tort exists infers
that the Michigan Legislature meant to further restrict the intentional tort
exception. Therefore, an examination of the legislative history may shed
light on the scope of the legislature's intended standard.
B. Policy Considerations that Influenced the Michigan Legislature's De-
cision to Codify the Intentional Tort Exception
Legislative materials indicate that the Michigan Legislature drafted
the ambiguous intentional tort definition in an effort to balance the oppos-
ing interests of industry and labor.147 The legislature was concerned about
the effect that the Michigan Supreme Court decision that adopted the sub-
stantial certainty test might have on the Michigan business community. 48
Senate committee meeting notes reveal that workers' compensation rates
are eighteen percent higher in Michigan than in the other Great Lakes
states.1 49 In addition, during the 1980s, Michigan has suffered one of the
highest unemployment rates in the nation, 50 increasing unemployment
147. At senate committee meetings, speakers presented the problems of injured employ-
ees who must be adequately compensated for intentional torts, and business organizations that
are concerned about the high cost of Michigan workers' compensation coverage. See supra
note 123.
148. MICHIGAN SENATE, SENATE FISCAL AGENCY BILL ANALYSIS 4 (May 26, 1987)
(quoted infra note 149). See generally Epstein, supra note 28, at 809 (businesses leave a state
when labor costs rise). Labor costs include workers' compensation premiums and unemploy-
ment, as well as wages and health insurance.
149. See MICHIGAN SENATE, SENATE FISCAL AGENCY BILL ANALYSIS 4 (May 26,
1987).
According to a 1984 poll of the Michigan Manufacturers Association membership,
worker's compensation was the number one disincentive to doing business in Michigan.
Michigan's costs are among the highest in the nation and appear particularly unfavorable
when compared with other Great Lakes states. According to the report of Professor The-
odore J. St. Antoine (appointed by the Governor to review the workers' compensation
system), Michigan's insurance rates remain about 18% higher than the average of the
rest of the Great Lakes states . . . . By addressing the definition of "disability" and
strengthening the exclusive remedy provision, the bill significantly would enhance Michi-
gan's economic prospects by decreasing workers' compensation costs.
Id.
150. While workers' compensation and unemployment are separate programs, produc-
tion costs are higher when the employer provides higher benefits for both programs than em-
ployers in other states provide. Unemployment has been a continuing problem in Michigan
during the 1980s. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 393 (107th ed. 1987). In 1982, the Michigan unemployment
rate was the highest in the nation (15.5%) and it was fourth highest in the nation in 1985
(9.9%). Id. See also Outlook for the Auto Industry and Its Impact on Employment. Indus-
tries, and Communities Dependent Upon It: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Economic
Development of the House of Representatives Committee on Public Works and Transporta-
tion, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (at Lansing, Mich.).
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costs to industry and government. Committee notes suggest that the Michi-
gan Legislature meant to indicate to industry that Michigan is serious
about providing a more favorable business climate by amending the work-
ers' compensation statute in a manner which would provide more competi-
tively priced labor.151
While protecting business, the Michigan Legislature was also con-
cerned about the state's legitimate concern for the safety of its citizens.
Michigan promotes the health and safety of its citizens by recognizing the
employees' right to sue for intentional torts at common law because tort
suits may subject employers to the deterrent effect of punitive damages. 152
One of the goals of allowing intentional tort actions for workplace accidents
is to deter unsafe working conditions by assessing damages which are more
than the cost of making the workplace safe.153 The Michigan Legislature
recognized the need to define the intentional tort exception expansively
enough so that employers would not be allowed to use workers' compensa-
tion to "cost out" employees' injuries. 154
Despite these sometimes depressing statistics, Gov. Milliken laid a major economic devel-
opment program before the legislature last September. It was designed to eliminate the
two major barriers to business growth in Michigan: the high cost of excesses in worker's
compensation and unemployment insurance demonstrably much higher than in other
states.
Id. at 12 (Statement of Dr. Gerald H. Miller, Director, Michigan Department of Management
and Budget). See also supra note 149 (stating that in 1987 Michigan was still struggling with
labor costs that were higher than other states).
151. The 1987 Michigan amendment redefined "disability" and codified the intentional
tort exception. See MICHIGAN SENATE, SENATE FISCAL AGENCY BILL ANALYSIS 2 (May 26,
1987). The supporting argument for changing the definition of "disability" stated:
Further, redefining 'disability' would send an important message to the business and
manufacturing community that Michigan is serious about reforming its system and re-
ducing employer costs. It would make a positive change in the perception others have of
our law, its impact on employers, and our intentions to mitigate that impact. Having the
same definition as other states would help us argue our competitive position and send a
signal that Michigan is capable of responding constructively to changes in the economy.
Id. at 5-6.
152. Cf. Comment, supra note 52, at 905-06 (allowing employers immunity for willful
misconduct does little to deter them from maintaining an unsafe workplace).
153. See also Bohyer, supra note 110, at 160-61. It is imperative that the workers' com-
pensation system allow injured employees a tort action so that the employer will either make
the work environment safe or suffer the economic consequences. Id. Insurance companies can-
not seek indemnification against the employer due to the exclusive remedy rule; they can only
increase the rates to all insureds. Id. Rising rates are a concern to careful employers, but have
not effectively decreased reckless employer misconduct. Id. Accord, Amchan, supra note 6, at
687 (asserting that the workers' compensation system aids those employers "who are inclined
to be careless" to the detriment of those who are careful).
154. The term "cost out" refers to an employer's decision to expose workers to injuries
because workers' compensation benefits cost less than improving workplace safety. See Blank-
enship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 617, 433 N.E.2d 572, 579
(1982) (Celebreeze, C.J., concurring). Cf. Note, supra note 35, at 1646-47. Employers have
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After evaluating the opposing employer and employee interests, the
Michigan Legislature drafted an intentional tort definition which attempted
to protect both industry and labor.1  Unfortunately, the ambiguous lan-
guage used in the definition provides little guidance to indicate where the
legislature decided to draw the line on intentional torts.156 Therefore, litiga-
tion will likely increase for several years while the Michigan courts inter-
pret the statutory definition. 57
C. Comparison of the Michigan Statute to Statutes of Other
Jurisdictions
The problems with the Michigan amendment's codification of the in-
tentional tort exception are most effectively explained through comparison
to the statutes and experiences of other jurisdictions,8 8 notably Ohio and
greater control of workplace hazards than employees have and placing the financial burden for
willfully negligent employee injury on employers will make safety measures more attractive.
Id. Accord Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co., 427 Mich. 1, 25, 398 N.W.2d 882, 893 (1986). See
also Bohlen, supra note 26, at 334-35.
It would be nice to think that employers are impelled by humane motives to consider the
health and safety of their employees as the paramount concern. But the unfortunate truth
is that business reacts best to hopes of profit maximization. Where some employers can
avoid more costly protections for their employees without incurring additional liability,
they usually will do so. Employers generally will act only if given the monetary incentive
to do so.
Id.
155. See supra note 123 (identifying groups who voiced their concerns to the Michigan
Legislature).
156. See supra note 14 (Senators Dillingham and Cherry attempt to provide the courts
with insight into legislative intent).
157. See supra note 19 (stating that when the statutory language is ambiguous, the
courts must ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent).
158. Two approaches will not be discussed in detail because they provide little more
relief than the true intentional tort test. The first approach is used in Arizona, which allows an
intentional tort exception for willful and wanton employer misconduct, but defines willful and
wanton misconduct as an act done deliberately and purposely with the direct object of injuring
another. The result is that a standard which initially appears more lenient than the true inten-
tional tort test is, in effect, no different. The statute reads as follows:
A. The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries sustained by an
employee or for the death of an employee is the exclusive remedy against the employer or
any co-employee acting in the scope of his employment, and against the employer's work-
ers' compensation insurance carrier or administrative service representative, except as
provided by § 23-906 [allows election of remedies], and except that if the injury is caused
by the employer's wilful misconduct, or in the case of a co-employee by the co-employee's
wilful misconduct, and the act causing the injury is the personal act of the employer, or
in the case of a co-employee the personal act of the co-employee, . . . and the act indi-
cates a wilful disregard of the life, limb or bodily safety of the employees, the injured
employee may either claim compensation or maintain an action at law for damages
against the person or entity alleged to have engaged in the wilful misconduct.
B. "Wilful misconduct" as used in this section means an act done knowingly and pur-
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West Virginia."59 Like Michigan, those states amended their workers' com-
pensation statutes to resolve the intentional tort dilemma after state su-
preme court decisions enlarged the exception.160 Problems arising from ju-
dicially established standards persuaded these legislatures to codify and
define the exception in order to preserve the exclusive remedy provision. 61
An analysis of those statutes will provide suggestions for more effective leg-
islation in Michigan.
1. The Ohio Response to the Intentional Tort Quagmire
The Ohio statute represents one approach to the problem of delineating
the true intentional tort exception. Ohio codified this exception by amend-
ment in 1986,162 following decisions by the Ohio Supreme Court which
posely with the direct object of injuring another.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1022 (Supp. 1987).
See, e.g., Serna v. Statewide Contractors, Inc., 6 Ariz. App. 12, 429 P.2d 504 (1967). Two
employees were killed when a 25-foot deep ditch they were digging caved in and buried them.
Id. at 13, 429 P.2d at 505. The ditch had previously caved in once, burying one of the dece-
dents to his waist. Id. at 13, 429 P.2d at 505. Durihg the five months before the second cave-
in, the employers had ignored repeated warnings by safety inspectors that the sides of the ditch
should be sloped and shored and escape ladders should be placed every 25 feet. Id. at 14, 429
P.2d at 506. The court "regretfully" held that the facts did not bring the plaintiffs (widows
and children of the decedents) within the statutory exception. Id. at 16, 429 P.2d at 508.
Serna is one of the cases that the Supreme Court of Michigan used to illustrate a situation
which would satisfy the substantial certainty standard. See Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co.,
427 Mich. 1, 25, 398 N.W.2d 882, 893 (1986). The second approach allows additional benefits
within the workers' compensation system for employer misconduct. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 11-9-503 (1987) (allows 25% increase in benefits); CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West 1989)
(50% increase for serious and willful employer misconduct); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.165
(Baldwin 1986) (15% increase); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 28 (West 1988) (100%
increase for employer's serious and wilful misconduct); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.120(4) (Vernon
1988) (15% increase); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-10 (1981) (10% increase); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97-12 (1985) (10% increase); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-12 (1988) (15% increase); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 102.57 (West 1988) (15% increase).
159. See infra note 162 (Ohio amended its statute to clarify the intentional tort excep-
tion in 1986) and infra note 190 (West Virginia similarly amended its statute in 1983).
160. The Ohio Legislature was responding to Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron
Chems. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572 (1982) and Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 15 Ohio
St. 3d 90, 472 N.E.2d 1046 (1984) (see cases described infra note 163); West Virginia was
responding to Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978) (see descrip-
tion infra note 201).
161. See infra notes 163 and 199-201 and accompanying text.
162. The statute reads as follows:
(A) If injury, occupational disease, or death results to any employee from the inten-
tional tort of his employer, the employee or the dependents of a deceased employee have
the right to receive workers' compensation benefits under Chapter 4123 of the Revised
Code and have a cause of action against the employer for an excess of damages over the
amount received or receivable under Chapter 4123 of the Revised Code. . . . All de-
fenses are preserved for and shall be available to the employer in defending against an
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action brought under this section. . . . In no event shall any action be brought pursuant
to this section more than two years after the occurrence of the act constituting the al-
leged intentional tort.
(B) It is declared that . . . the establishment of the workers' compensation system is
intended to remove from the common law tort system all disputes between or among
employers and employees regarding the compensation to be received for injury or death
to an employee except as herein expressly provided, and to establish a system which com-
pensates even though the injury or death of an employee may be caused by his own fault
or the fault of a co-employee; that the immunity established in Section 35, Article II of
the Ohio Constitution and sections 4123.74 and 4123.741 of the Revised Code is an es-
sential aspect of Ohio's workers' compensation system; that the intent of the legislature in
providing immunity from common law suit is to protect those so immunized from litiga-
tion outside the workers' compensation system except as herein expressly provided; and
that it is the legislative intent to promote prompt judicial resolution of the question of
whether a suit based upon a claim of an intentional tort prosecuted under the asserted
authority of this section is or is not an intentional tort and therefore is or is not prohibited
by the immunity granted under Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution and Chap-
ter 4123 of the Revised Code.
(C) Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule to the contrary, and consis-
tent with the legislative findings of intent to promote prompt judicial resolution of issues
of immunity from litigation under Chapter 4123 of the Revised Code, the court shall
dismiss the action:
(1) upon motion for summary judgment, if it finds, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure the facts required to be proved by division (B) of this section do not
exist;
(2) upon a timely motion for a directed verdict against the plaintiff if after consider-
ing all the evidence and every inference legitimately and reasonably raised thereby most
favorably to the plaintiff, the court determines that there is not sufficient evidence to find
the facts required to be proven.
(D) In any action brought pursuant to this section, the court is limited to a determi-
nation as to whether or not the employer is liable for damages on the basis that the
employer committed an intentional tort. If the court determines that the employee or his
estate is entitled to an award under this section and that determination has become final,
the industrial commission shall, after hearing, determine what amount of damages should
be awarded. For that purpose, the commission has original jurisdiction. In making that
determination, the commission shall consider the compensation and benefits payable
under Chapter 4123 of the Revised Code and the net financial loss to the employee
caused by the employers intentional tort. In no event shall the total amount to be received
by the employee or his estate from the intentional tort award be less than fifty per cent of
no more than three times the total compensation receivable pursuant to Chapter 4123 of
the Revised Code, but in no event may an award under this section exceed one million
dollars. Payments of an award made pursuant to this section shall be from the intentional
tort fund. All legal fees, including attorney fees as fixed by the industrial commission,
incurred by the employer in defending an action brought pursuant to this section shall be
paid by the intentional tort fund.
(G) As used in this section:
(1) "intentional tort" is an act committed with the intent to injure another or com-
mitted with the belief that the injury is substantially certain to occur.
Deliberate removal by the employer of an equipment safety guard or deliberate mis-
representation of a toxic or hazardous substance is evidence, the presumption of which
may be rebutted, of an act committed with the intent to injure another if injury or an
occupational disease or condition occurs as a direct result.
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adopted the substantial certainty test 6 s and permitted litigation which
would test the limits of the standard.' Because the intentional tort defini-
tion in the Ohio statute is equally as ambiguous as that in the Michigan
statute,16 5 the Ohio statute exemplifies the difficulty that legislatures face
when developing a statutory definition of an intentional tort. 6 ' The Ohio
statute also reflects the Ohio Legislature's reluctance to choose either the
"Substantially certain" means that an employer acts with deliberate intent to cause
an employee to suffer injury, disease, condition, or death.
1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. § 4121.80 (Baldwin).
163. Blankenship and Jones were particularly important. In Blankenship, employees al-
leged that their employers knowingly exposed them to chemical fumes which caused pain,
discomfort, and emotional distress which would extend into the indefinite future. Blankenship,
69 Ohio St. 2d at 608, 433 N.E.2d at 573. The case had been dismissed and the Ohio Supreme
Court held that the lower court had insufficient facts before it to determine that dismissal was
appropriate. Id. at 616, 433 N.E.2d at 578. In effect, the court granted the plaintiffs an oppor-
tunity to prove their case. Jones, which consolidated three cases, went considerably further. In
one of those cases, the decedent's job included clearing a coal conveyor system. Jones, 15 Ohio
St. 3d at 91, 472 N.E.2d at 1048. The employer used a blow torch to cut the sheet metal
safety guard off the chute and a pulley subsequently caught the employee's hand and drew him
in. Id. at 91, 472 N.E.2d at 1048. He was found an hour later, severely injured, and later died
as a result of his injuries. Id. at 91, 472 N.E.2d at 1048. The court held that specific intent to
injure was not an essential element, reversed summary judgment, and remanded for trial under
the substantial certainty test. Id. at 95, 472 N.E.2d at 1051. Thus, the court adopted the
substantial certainty test.
164. See, e.g., Bryant v. Lawson Milk Co., 22 Ohio App. 3d 69, 488 N.E.2d 934 (1985)
(an unknown assailant beat and raped a convenience store night shift employee). Based on
Jones, the court remanded for a trial as an intentional tort by the employer. Id. at 72-73, 488
N.E.2d at 939. See also Helton v. King Kwik Minit Mkt., Inc., 24 Ohio Misc. 2d 34, 495
N.E.2d 62 (1985). Helton was another case where the employee sued for an intentional tort
after being raped during the night shift. Id. at 35, 495 N.E.2d at 63. The employer did not
permit women to work the night shift unless they requested it. Id. at 35, 495 N.E.2d at 63.
The court held that rape was not substantially certain when only seven assaults or molestations
had occurred in eighty-nine stores in five years. Id. at 36-37, 495 N.E.2d at 64. Although the
court issued summary judgment for the defendant, he was forced to defend a lawsuit for an
intentional tort because a third party attacked the employee. Id. at 36, 495 N.E.2d at 63-64.
The case is illustrative of the type of cases that are instituted to test the limits of the exception
when a vague, more lenient standard is established.
165. See infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 14 & 16 and
text accompanying notes 14-18.
166. See supra note 25 (enumerating the objectives of workers' compensation statutes).
See also Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d at 615, 433 N.E.2d
at 577. In Blankenship, the court held that promoting a safe and injury free work environment
is an avowed purpose of Ohio workers' compensation. Id. at 615, 433 N.E.2d at 577. The court
further held that granting the employer immunity for conduct which displays a lack of concern
for employee health does not promote this purpose because the employer can commit inten-
tional acts with impunity knowing that at the very most his workers' compensation premiums
may rise slightly. Id. at 615, 433 N.E.2d at 577. In addition, the court noted that workers'
compensation is based on insurance principles, which do not protect policy holders from inten-
tional torts. Id. at 615, 433 N.E.2d at 577. Therefore workers' compensation should not pro-
tect employers from intentional torts.
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true intentional tort test or the substantial certainty test, a vacillation
clearly evident in the Michigan statute as well. 67 The Ohio Legislature
initially adopted the more liberal substantial certainty test,'68 and then con-
tradicted itself by restrictively defining substantial certainty as a deliberate
intent to injure. 69 The Ohio amendment, like Michigan's, uses terminology
that is an incomprehensible mixture of the phrases of the two tests.
Although the Ohio statute's definition of an intentional tort is virtually
a riddle, the statute is superior to Michigan's statute because it provides a
presumption of an intentional tort in two problematic situations. The em-
ployee must establish that the employer either deliberately removed an
equipment safety guard" 0 or deliberately misrepresented the toxic or haz-
ardous nature of chemicals to which the employee was exposed ."' If the
employee is injured as a result of either situation, the statute creates a re-
buttable presumption that the employer committed an intentional tort." 2
An Ohio employee with evidence that his employer intentionally re-
moved a safety guard, unlike a similarly situated Michigan employee, is
aided by the presumption which shifts the burden of producing evidence to
the employer."73 If the employer produces no evidence in rebuttal, the em-
ployee must win. 7 For example, consider an employee who works near a
conveyor. Assume that the employer, in order to hasten production, removes
a guard which was designed to prevent the conveyor from catching the em-
ployee's clothing and pulling him in. Then consider that the conveyor en-
traps the employee and disables him."75 When the employee presents evi-
167. See supra text accompanying notes 14-18.
168. An intentional tort is "an act committed with the intent to injure or committed
with the belief that injury is substantially certain to occur." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4121.80(G)(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1987) (set out supra note 162).
169. Substantial certainty "means that the employer acts with deliberate intent to cause
injury, disease, condition, or death." OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(G)(1) (Baldwin
Supp. 1987) (set out supra note 162). In the controversy between the true intentional tort test
and the substantial certainty test, the Ohio Legislature has gone full circle, because deliberate
intent is traditionally associated with the true intentional tort test. See Ghiardi, supra note 12,
at 155 (stating that deliberate intent is identified with the true intentional tort test).
170. See, e.g., Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 90, 472 N.E.2d 1046 (1984)
(described supra note 163).
171. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433
N.E.2d 572 (1982) (described supra note 163).
172. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(G)(I) (Baldwin Supp. 1987) (set out supra
note 162).
173. See generally E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, §§ 343-45, at 968-87 (3d
ed. 1984). A presumption shifts the burden of producing evidence and possibly the burden of
persuasion, as well. Id. at 968.
174. If the defendant produces no evidence, the judge will instruct the jury to find for
the plaintiff. Id. at 344, 973-74.
175. The example is based on one of the three cases combined in Jones. Jones v. VIP
Dev. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 90, 472 N.E.2d 1046 (1984) (see facts described supra note 163).
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dence that the employer deliberately removed the safety guard, the
presumption is triggered, shifting the burden of producing evidence to the
employer. In the hypothetical, the employer has no rebuttal evidence be-
cause he removed the safety guard to increase production. The presump-
tion, therefore, entitles the plaintiff to a directed verdict. 17 By enacting this
statutory presumption, the Ohio Legislature, unlike the Michigan Legisla-
ture, has motivated employers to improve workplace environments by noti-
fying employers that it will not tolerate the removal of safety equipment.1
77
The Ohio statute, unlike Michigan's statute, simultaneously protects
employers against frivolous suits.'18 The legislature has deterred frivolous
suits by placing the initial burden of presenting evidence that the employer
intentionally removed or failed to install safety equipment on the plain-
tiff."" In this manner, the Ohio provision protects the employer who negli-
The presumption provided in the amendment codifies the exact situation presented in Jones.
Therefore the effect of the amendment is to prevent expansion of the intentional tort exception
and increased litigation in an attempt to test the exception's limits, rather than to overrule
Jones. The court was liberal in Jones, allowing the representative to sue for an intentional tort
after collecting workers' compensation, a practice which had been prohibited in some
jurisdictions.
176. See supra notes 172-74.
177. The presumption should be a significant factor in improving industrial safety be-
cause the publication of the statute forewarns employers that they are subject to significant
financial liability anytime deliberate removal of an equipment safety guard causes injury to an
employee. See generally note 153-54 and accompanying text.
178. First, employees whose injuries do not meet the standard will not attempt to evade
workers' compensation and pursue an intentional tort action for other workplace injuries. The
Ohio Legislature has decided to limit the presumption to these two situations because removal
of safety equipment and exposure to hazardous substances are common manufacturing
problems which must be deterred. By contrast there is no presumption of an employer's inten-
tional tort when a third party rapes an employee while she is working. Clearly the legislature is
indicating that there is less intent in allowing an unsafe condition, than in creating one. See,
e.g., McKinley v. Holiday Inn, 115 Mich. App. 160, 320 N.W.2d 329 (1982); Bryant v. Law-
son Milk Co., 22 Ohio App. 3d 69, 488 N.E.2d 934 (1985); Helton v. Minit Mkt., Inc., 24
Ohio Misc. 2d 63, 495 N.E.2d 63 (1986). In McKinley, a hotel maid alleged that the employer
knew her position as hotel maid was dangerous, and the maid sued her employer when a hotel
guest raped her. Id. at 161, 320 N.W.2d at 330. The court held that the hotel was negligent in
assigning her to work alone but had not committed an intentional tort. Id. at 165, 320 N.W.2d
at 332. Workers' compensation was her exclusive remedy. Id. at 166, 320 N.W.2d at 332.
Second, the plaintiff knows that he must present preliminary evidence of deliberate employer
action. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 384 (5th ed. 1983). Deliberate means "carefully con-
sidered . . . [w]illful rather than merely intentional." Id.
179. "Deliberate removal of an equipment safety guard or deliberate misrepresentation
of toxic or hazardous nature of chemical is evidence. ... OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §
4121.80(G)(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1987) (set out supra note 162). The plaintiff must initially
present that evidence. For examples of the types of conduct which satisfies the statute, see
Griffin v. George's, Inc., 267 Ark. 91, 589 S.W.2d 24 (1979) (employee was killed when he fell
into a grain augur from which the employer had removed a guard) and Jones, 15 Ohio St. 3d
90, 472 N.E.2d 1046 (facts described supra note 163).
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gently failed to foresee the need to install safety guards because his em-
ployee will not be able to present evidence of intent. 180
The Ohio statute is unsatisfactory with respect to chemically induced
illnesses and death.181 The presumption is not triggered until the employer
deliberately misrepresents the chemical's dangerous nature. 8' The em-
ployer, however, has no reason to deliberately misrepresent the hazardous
nature of the substance until the employee complains about fumes, a sting-
ing sensation, or some other noticeable physical effect. Thus, the statute
only assists employees who complain and are falsely reassured by their em-
ployers' deliberate misrepresentations. 8 3 The presumption does not aid
those employees who do not complain because they are not aware that the
chemical is a health threat.' 84 In that situation, the employer will have no
180. Accidents are an unavoidable incident of production. Workers' compensation is
designed to provide compensation for negligently caused work-related accidents. Just as it pro-
vides exclusive coverage when an employee negligently injures himself, it is the exclusive rem-
edy when an employer negligently injures an employee. See supra notes 41 & 76.
181. The problem is that the employer must make a deliberate misrepresentation to trig-
ger the presumption. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(G)(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1987) (set out
supra note 162).
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., People v. Film Recovery, Nos. 84-C-5064, 83-C-I 1091 (Cir. Ct. of Cook
County, Ill. June 14, 1985), appealfiled, Nos. 85-C-184, 85-C-1952 (Ill. App. Ct. July 1,
1985). The ease is unreported but has been discussed extensively by various authors. See, e.g.,
Magnuson & Leviton, Policy Considerations in Corporate Criminal Prosecutions After Peo-
ple v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc., 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913 (1987); Burnett, Corporate
Murder Verdict May Not Become Trend, Say Legal Experts, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH &
SAFETY, Oct. 1985, at 22; Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co., 427 Mich. 1, 398 N.W.2d 882
(1986); 2A A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 68.15, at 13-62. In Film Recovery, the employees
complained daily that cyanide solutions and fumes caused nausea, dizziness, headaches, and
burning and itching of their skin. Magnuson & Leviton, supra at 914. The company president
admitted that he knew how dangerous the cyanide fumes and solutions were and that he was
at the plant daily and knew employees were sick. Burnett, supra at 24. Most of the employees
were undocumented Hispanics and Poles who spoke and read little or no English. Id. at 22;
Beauchamp, 427 Mich. at 23, 398 N.W.2d at 892. The employers also removed the warning
labels from the cyanide containers in case anyone could read English. Burnett, supra at 22.
When an inspector warned that the operation had outgrown the building, the employers moved
the executive offices and enlarged operations. Beauchamp, 427 Mich. at 24, 398 N.W.2d at
892-93. Film Recovery, a murder/manslaughter case, exemplifies the type of employer mis-
conduct for which the decedent's representatives could bring an intentional tort action under
the Ohio intentional tort exception. See also Kofron v. Amoco Chems. Co., 441 A.2d 226
(Del. 1982) (employer knew how dangerous asbestos was, but told employees that it was safe
to work near it).
184. See, e.g., Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co., 427 Mich. 1, 398 N.W.2d 882 (1986). A
research chemist was exposed to "agent orange" at work and filed suit 14 years later. Id. at 4
& n.l, 398 N.W.2d at 883 & n.l. The critical question would be whether the company made
deliberate misrepresentations to the plaintiff. There is no indication that Ronald Beauchamp
was aware of the danger when he was exposed. There was also no evidence whether the em-
ployer had knowledge because the case involved an appeal of defendant-employer's summary
judgment.
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reason to deliberately misrepresent the hazard and the presumption in favor
of the employee will not be triggered. 185
One might argue that the deliberate misrepresentation requirement is
necessary to protect employers from frivolous suits, a basic goal of workers'
compensation.288 However, the litigation prevention goal would be served
equally well by providing a presumption of an intentional tort whenever an
employer knowingly exposes an employee to a toxic substance.187 Concur-
rently, a knowing exposure presumption would protect those employers who
were not cognizant of the chemical's dangerous nature because the em-
ployee cannot prove that such an employer knowingly exposed him to
danger. 88
The employer's disregard of employee health is equally reprehensible
when the employer knowingly exposes the noncomplaining employee to a
known toxic substance as when the employer deliberately misrepresents the
nature of a toxic chemical. Thus, the deliberate misrepresentation require-
ment in the Ohio statute weakens a provision which is potentially a strong
deterrent to reprehensible employer activity. 89
The Ohio statute, in contrast to the Michigan amendment, explicitly
provides the employer with several benefits to balance the benefit extended
to employees by the presumption. The statute first protects the employer
against runaway damage awards by submitting only the liability issue to
the jury, reserving the damage determination to the industrial commis-
sion.' g° Second, the statute sets a ceiling on the amount of damages.' 9'
185. Not only will employers avoid anything that might be considered a deliberate mis-
representation, they will be motivated to shred any records that would prove that they had
knowledge of any hazard. Thus their knowledge of the hazard cannot be revealed through
discovery in a case in which a judge might be inclined to rule that simply exposing employees
to dangerous chemicals constituted a deliberate misrepresentation that the chemicals were
safe. See generally U.S. Companies Pay Increasing Attention to Destroying Files, The Wall
Street Journal, Sept. 2, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
186. Vieweg, supra note 25, at 422 and accompanying text (reporting that limited em-
ployer liability was one of three original goals of workers' compensation).
187. Consider, for example, exposure to asbestos. Employers would not be guilty of an
intentional tort until they learned of the danger to employees. But if the employer continued to
use the product after he knew of the danger, perhaps because of the expense involved in re-
placing the substance, he would be chargeable with an intentional tort. See, e.g., Johns-
Manville Prods. Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 858 (1980); Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 101 N.J. 161, 501 A.2d 506 (1985).
188. See cases cited supra note 187 (employer chargeable with intentional tort for expo-
sure after he learned of danger, but not for original injury).
189. See generally Amchan, supra note 6, at 687-88.
190. See OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1987) (set out supra
note 162). The commission is an administrative agency dealing with workers' compensation.
191. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1987) (set out supra
note 162).
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Third, the statute directs the industrial commission to review attorneys'
fees, which enables the agency to control attorneys' fees and prevents attor-
neys from encouraging litigation in weak cases.192 Finally, the statute cre-
ates an intentional tort fund to pay the damage awards and attorneys'
fees.1 93
The statute also conserves judicial resources by providing a policy
statement which stresses legislative support for the exclusive remedy provi-
sion19' and explicitly provides for summary judgment and directed verdict
when warranted. 95 Unlike Michigan, the Ohio statute spells out the bal-
ancing of the employee's gain through the creation of the rebuttable pre-
sumption against the employer's gain by providing for a ceiling on benefits
and establishment of the tort fund.
2. The West Virginia Legislature's Response to Increased Litigation
and High Damage Awards
The West Virginia Legislature, like the Michigan and Ohio Legisla-
tures, amended its statute to codify and define the intentional tort excep-
tion.196 The Act overruled the West Virginia Supreme Court's establish-
192. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(F) (Baldwin Supp. 1987) (set out supra
note 162).
193. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(E) (Baldwin Supp. 1987) (set out supra
note 162).
194. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1987) (set out supra
note 162).
195. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(C) (Baldwin Supp. 1987) (set out supra
note 162).
196. The statute reads:
(2) The immunity from suit provided under this section and under section six-a §
23-2-6a], article two of this chapter, may be lost only if the employer or person against
whom liability is asserted acted with "deliberate intention." This requirement may be
satisfied only if:
(i) It is proved that such employer or person against whom liability is asserted acted
with a consciously, subjectively and deliberately formed intention to produce the specific
result of injury or death to an employee. This standard requires a showing of an actual,
specific intent and may not be satisfied by allegation or proof of (A) conduct which pro-
duces a result that was not specifically intended; (B) conduct which constitutes negli-
gence, no matter how gross or aggravated; or (C) willful, wanton or reckless misconduct;
or
(ii) The trier of fact determines, either through specific findings of fact made by the
court in a trial without a jury, or through special interrogatories to the jury in a jury
trial, that all of the following facts are proven:
(A) That a specific unsafe working condition existed in the workplace which
presented a high degree of risk and a strong probability of serious injury or death;
(B) That the employer had a subjective realization and an appreciation of the exis-
tence of such specific unsafe working condition and of the high degree of risk and the
strong probability of serious injury or death presented by such specific unsafe working
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ment of the willful, wanton, and reckless misconduct standard for
intentional torts.1 7 The legislature first declared that the true intentional
tort test would be the standard198 in an effort to reduce litigation199 and
excessive damage awards.200 The West Virginia Legislature, unlike Michi-
condition;
(C) That such specific unsafe working condition was a violation of a state of federal
safety statute, rule or regulation, whether cited or not, or of a commonly accepted and
well-known safety standard within the industry or business of such employer, which stat-
ute, rule, regulation or standard was specifically applicable to the particular work and
working condition involved, as contrasted with a statute, rule, regulation or standard gen-
erally requiring safe workplaces, equipment or working conditions;
(D) That notwithstanding the existence of the facts set forth in subparagraphs (A)
through (C) hereof, such employer nevertheless thereafter exposed an employee to such
specific unsafe working condition intentionally; and
(E) That such employee so exposed suffered serious injury or death as a direct and
proximate result of such specific unsafe working condition.
(iii) In cases alleging liability under the provisions of the preceding paragraph (ii):
(A) No punitive or exemplary damages shall be awarded to the employee or other
plaintiff;
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule to the contrary, and consis-
tent with the legislative findings of intent to promote prompt judicial resolution of issues
of immunity from litigation under this chapter, the court shall dismiss the action upon
motion for summary judgment if it shall find, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure that one or more of the facts required to be proved by the provisions of subpar-
agraphs (A) through (E) of the preceding paragraph (ii) do not exist, and the court shall
dismiss the action upon a timely motion for a directed verdict against the plaintiff if after
considering all the evidence and every inference legitimately and reasonably raised
thereby most favorably to the plaintiff, the court shall determine that there is not suffi-
cient evidence to find each and every one of the facts required to be proven by the provi-
sions of subparagraph [sic] (A) through (E) of the preceding paragraph (ii) ....
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c)(2) (1985).
197. See W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c)(2)(i)(C) (1985); Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., 161
W. Va. 695, 246 S.E.2d 907 (1978). But see infra note 201 (legislature overrules the standard
but tailors the exception to the facts of Mandolidis).
198. See W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c)(2)(i) (1985) (set out supra note 196) (intentional
tort requires a "consciously, subjectively, and deliberately formed intention . . ").
199. See generally Note, supra note 145. Following the Mandolidis decision, which
adopted willful, wanton, and reckless misconduct as the standard, plaintiffs had instituted liti-
gation to test the limits of the exception. Id. Courts were reluctant to issue summary judgment
because the Mandolidis opinion suggested that willful and wanton negligence was a jury ques-
tion. See also supra note 146 (juror's affidavit explaining how one substantial verdict was
determined). See also infra note 200 (explaining Cline v. Joy Mfg. Co., 310 S.E.2d 835 (W.
Va. 1983)). But see 2A A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 68.15, at 13-48 (stating that the West
Virginia courts construed the exception narrowly). The disagreement between the two com-
mentators is explained by the different times at which they evaluated the courts' response. The
note was written after several trial court decisions whereas Professor Larson's evaluation was
written after final disposition of those cases. Although the exclusive remedy provision was ulti-
mately protected, the employers were required to go to considerable expense defending the suit
and pursuing the appeals.
200. See Note, supra note 145, at 927-28. See, e.g., Cline v. Joy Mfg. Co., 310 S.E.2d
835 (W. Va. 1983). The plaintiff was severely injured while operating a mining machine while
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gan's, also provided an alternate five-part method of proof for cases in
which the employer knowingly exposed the employee to unsafe working
conditions which caused injury or death.20 1 The employee must present evi-
dence that the employer knew a dangerous condition existed, that he sub-
jectively appreciated the risk of serious injury, that he violated a safety
code or industry practice, that he nevertheless exposed the employee to the
known danger, and that the dangerous condition consequently injured the
employee.20
2
Although helpful to plaintiffs, the alternate method of proof is severely
limited by the requirement that the employer must violate a safety code or
industry practice.203 The statute does not burden the plaintiff by requiring
evidence that the employer had been cited for violation of a safety code, but
it does require the plaintiff to prove that the employer violated a rule of the
safety statute, code, or regulation.204 Unfortunately, many of the safety
codes and rules are vague or ambiguous so in practice an employer may not
be held liable if he has not been cited for a violation.20 5 Thus, in many
situations, employers may continue unsafe practices until they are cited for
a violation, with little fear of liability for intentional tort suits.208 The re-
quirement of violating an industry practice is also detrimental to employees
because employers are insulated from liability for maintaining unsafe work-
standing outside it. Id. at 836. From that position, he could not trigger the cut-off switches. Id.
at 837. The court stated that there was no evidence on the record that he was ordered to
operate the machine in that manner. Id. at 839-40. The jury verdict of four million dollars was
three times the mining company's assets. See Note, supra note 145, at 928 n.216. The verdict
was reversed and remanded for new trial because the evidence as a matter of law was insuffi-
cient to support it. Cline, 310 S.E.2d at 841.
201. The test mirrored the situation presented in one of the cases presented in
Mandolidis. Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., 161 W. Va. 695, 264 S.E.2d 907 (1978). Other
workers had been injured by a table saw before the plaintiff was injured; safety officials had
tagged the saw as inoperable, but supervisors had removed the tag and ordered Mandolidis to
operate it. Mandolidis was made to believe that he would be fired if he refused to operate the
saw, and the saw severed two fingers and part of his hand. Id. at 707, 246 S.E.2d at 914. In
addition, when another employee complained about the saw after Mandolidis was injured, the
supervisor replied: "So what? He's getting compensation." Id. at 710, 246 S.E.2d at 916.
202. See W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii) (1985) (set out supra note 196). See also
Handley v. Union Carbide Corp., 620 F. Supp. 428 (S.D.W. Va. 1985). Applying the statute
as written, the court denied recovery to a plaintiff suffering a rare lung disease which required
him to use oxygen at all times. Id. at 444. The plaintiff-employee had worked transferring
chemicals to storage tanks at the plant and alleged that the employer acted with deliberate
intent, in exposing him to chemicals which caused his disease. Id. at 430. The court held that
the employee failed to show that his employer breached an industry standard on some allega-
tions and that his employer had knowledge on other allegations. Id. at 435.
203. See W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii)(C) (1985) (set out supra note 196).
204. Id.
205. Amchan, supra note 6, at 689-90.
206. See id. at 686-87 (stating that strong incentives are needed to motivate employers
to improve workplace safety).
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ing conditions as long as the industry generally conforms to the same stan-
dard.2 07 Hence, the statute does not sufficiently prompt the industry to im-
prove safety practices .20  While the West Virginia statute, unlike the
Michigan statute, clearly defines the intentional tort exception, it fails to
promote a safe work environment because it defines the exception very
narrowly.
The West Virginia statute protects employer interests by prohibiting
punitive damages for the unsafe working conditions suit.209 West Virginia
also provides a policy statement supporting the exclusive remedy2 10 and a
specific provision for summary judgment and directed verdict.2 11 Michigan,
by contrast, has no guidance regarding amount of awards, no policy state-
ment and no explicit summary judgment or directed verdict provision.21 2
IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO CLARIFY THE INTENTIONAL TORT
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION OF THE MICHIGAN
WORKER'S DISABILITY COMPENSATION ACT
The recent amendment to the Michigan Worker's Disability Compen-
sation Act codifying and defining the intentional tort exception is ambigu-
ous, neither affirming nor overruling the Michigan Supreme Court decision
which previously adopted the substantial certainty test. 18 Instead, the defi-
nition combines terminology associated with both the restrictive true inten-
tional tort test and the more expansive substantial certainty test.21 " The
ambiguous definition thus creates uncertainty and requires judicial
interpretation.
Relying on the ambiguous definition of specific intent, employees may
request the court to interpret the statutory definition as the substantial cer-
tainty test thereby allowing them to avoid workers' compensation's limited
benefits and pursue full compensatory and punitive damages through an
207. See generally Amchan, supra note 6, at 689.
208. Id. at 686-87.
209. See W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c)(2)(iii)(A) (1985) (set out supra note 196). See
supra note 200 (had been problems with unreasonably high awards, which were often reversed
on appeal, but nevertheless forced defendant to litigate).
210. See W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c)(1) (1985) ("in enacting the immunity provisions of
this chapter, the legislature intended to create a legislative standard ... of more narrow ap-
plication ... than the common law tort system . . ").
211. See W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c)(2)(iii)(B) (1985) (set out supra note 196).
212. The Michigan statute states that the existence of an intentional tort is a question of
law for the court to determine. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.131 (West Supp. 1988).
The legislature presumably meant that summary judgment or directed verdict should be
granted, when appropriate, but the intent is not as clear as West Virginia's express provision.
213. See supra notes 14, 123-25 & 128 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 14 and text accompanying notes 14-18.
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intentional tort suit.21 5 Employees will argue that the expansive definition is
needed to fairly compensate them and to deter employers from allowing
dangerous work conditions to exist.216 Employers will argue that the "spe-
cific intent" portion of the statute codified the true intentional tort standard
and thus immunized employers from tort liability except when they act
with the express purpose of injuring an employee.21 Employers will argue
that the more restrictive definition is necessary to prevent excessive litiga-
tion and maintain competitive production costs. 218 The ambiguous definition
will, therefore, frustrate the workers' compensation goals of providing
quick, standardized benefits and eliminating litigation.219
In construing the intentional tort definition, the court will initially look
at the statutory language and will conclude that it is ambiguous.220 The
legislative history will not assist the court in ascertaining legislative intent
because the committee minutes, bill analysis, and senate journal merely in-
dicate that the legislature was balancing Michigan's duty to protect its citi-
zens from harm against the state's need to reduce labor costs, attract busi-
ness, and provide jobs. 221 Neither the legislative history nor the statutory
language adequately informs the court where the legislature meant to draw
the line in defining an intentional tort.12
A solution that would benefit both Michigan workers and employers
would be to adopt a two-party statutory definition that combines the best
elements of the intentional tort definitions in the West Virginia and Ohio
statutes. Michigan should initially draft a definition similar to the one uti-
lized by West Virginia, which establishes the true intentional tort as the
standard, but clarifies that intent to injure should not be construed to re-
quire a desire to injure.223 Michigan should, however, reject West Virginia's
alternate five-part method of proving an intentional tort, which is too
closely linked to standard business practices and governmental inspections
to effectively motivate employers to provide a safe work environment.
A presumption, similar to the one in the Ohio statute, should be in-
cluded as an alternate method of proof for those problematic areas involv-
ing safety equipment removal and exposure to hazardous or toxic chemi-
cals.224  Michigan should reject Ohio's deliberate misrepresentation
215. See supra notes 4, 7, & 61-68 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 111-15 & 152-54 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 6 & 15-16 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 14.
223. See W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c)(2) (1985) (set out supra note 196).
224. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(G)(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1987) (set out supra
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requirement because it denies assistance to employees who did not complain
because they were not aware of the chemical's nature and, therefore, were
not reassured by means of a deliberate misrepresentation. Instead, Michi-
gan should only require that an employer deliberately expose an employee
to a chemical which the employer knows or reasonably should know to be
hazardous or toxic.
The severity of the injury and the method of proof should determine
which type of damages are available to the plaintiff. Punitive damages
should be permitted only when the employer exhibited a deliberate intent to
injure (which would fulfill the true intentional tort standard) and thereby
caused permanent total disability or death. Michigan's generous workers'
compensation benefits are adequate compensation for partial and temporary
injuries.2 25 When the presumption that removal or omission of safety equip-
ment or exposure to hazardous chemicals is the method of establishing lia-
bility, the intent to injure is less clear. Punitive damages should not be al-
lowed in these cases because the employer may have only intended to
produce his product or increase production. Nevertheless, the employer's
misconduct is egregious, and the employee or his representative should be
permitted to recover full compensatory damages if the employee is killed or
permanently and totally disabled. Thus, permanently and totally disabled
employees, or the representatives of deceased employees, will receive full
compensation for those types of injuries which occur most frequently in
modern industry and will, in addition, be permitted exemplary damages for
traditional intentional injuries.
The proposed amendment will create an intentional tort exception
which is slightly larger than the true intentional tort. The proposed defini-
tion, including the alternate method, should be construed to be narrower
than the substantial certainty test. The exception, as proposed, would not be
subject to enlargement to substantial risk.
The proposed amendment to the Michigan Worker's Disability Com-
pensation Act is as follows:
Sec. XXX (1) The right to the recovery of benefits as provided in this act
shall be the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer for a per-
sonal injury or occupational disease. The only exception to this exclusive
remedy is an intentional tort. An intentional tort shall exist when an em-
ployee is injured as the result of a deliberate act of the employer or his
agent, and the employer specifically intended an injury. Specific intent,
however, does not require that the employer desired to cause injury, disease,
or death or that injury, disease, or death was the only motive for the act.
The specific intent requirement is satisfied if the plaintiff presents convinc-
note 162).
225. See supra note 66.
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ing evidence:
(a) That the employer acted with a consciously, subjectively and delib-
erately formed intention to produce the specific result of injury, disease, or
death to an employee; or
(b) That the employer exposed employees to a substance when the em-
ployer knew or reasonably should have known that there was a high degree
of likelihood that such exposure would cause serious injury and the expo-
sure consequently killed or permanently and totally disabled the employee;
or
(c) That the employer has deliberately removed or omitted installing
safety equipment on machinery on which the employee was subsequently
killed or permanently and totally disabled.
(2) Proof of (b) or (c) shall create a presumption that the employer
intended to injure the employee. The presumption may be rebutted by evi-
dence that the employer was not aware of the toxicity of the substance or
by evidence that the employer removed the safety equipment for another
good and reasonable cause.
(3) Compensatory damages shall be available for (b) or (c). Punitive
damages shall not be available for (b) or (c). Both punitive and compensa-
tory damages shall be available for (a).
(4) The issue of whether an act was an intentional tort shall be a ques-
tion of law for the court. The court shall issue summary judgment or direct
a verdict when appropriate.
(5) This subsection shall not enlarge or reduce rights under law.
(6) As used in this section and section 827, "employee" includes the
person injured, his or her personal representatives and any other person to
whom a claim accrues by reason of injury to or death of the employee.
"Employer" includes the employers' insurer, a service agent to a self-in-
sured employer and the accident fund insofar as they furnish or fail to fur-
nish safety inspections or safety advisory services incident to providing
worker's compensation insurance or incident to a self-insured employer's li-
ability servicing contract.
V. CONCLUSION
The ambiguous language of the Michigan Worker's Disability Com-
pensation Act's definition of an intentional tort will increase litigation. Em-
ployers may legitimately request the court to interpret the definition as the
true intentional tort test and employees have grounds for asserting that the
legislature adopted the more liberal substantial certainty test. The court
will refer to the legislative history of the amendment defining the inten-
tional tort exception in an attempt to interpret the statute. The court will
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discover that the legislature was attempting to balance the interests of em-
ployees and employers, but will discover no conclusive indication of how the
legislature finally delineated the intentional tort exception's boundaries.
The Michigan Legislature should amend the statute to clarify the in-
tentional tort definition. The intentional tort exception should include a
two-part definition initially adopting the true intentional tort test; that is, a
specific intent to injure. In addition, the statute should provide a presump-
tion of an intentional tort when an employer deliberately removes or fails to
install an equipment safety guard or deliberately exposes an employee to a
chemical which the employer knows to be toxic or hazardous to human
health. The proposed amendment will provide guidelines to allow adequate
compensation for intentional torts and will decrease litigation.
GAIL S. PARKHURST
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